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* A related article published in this journal, Kimball and Pfennigstorf, Legislative
Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study, 39 IND. L.J. 675
(1964), examined legislative and judicial control of the provisions of insurance policies.
Ideally, it would have been better to publish all aspects of control of insurance policies
in one article, but length as well as complexity necessitated division of the subject matter.
The reader who wishes a more complete picture of public control of the terms of insur-
ance contracts should consult the earlier article and other available literature.-Ed. Note.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.j Dr. jur., University of Hamburg, Germany; M.C.L., University of Michigan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is part of a larger research project aimed at a more com-
plete understanding of insurance regulation.' The goal of this particular
article is to examine the methods of administrative control over insurance
1. See Kimball and Pfennigstorf, Legislative Control of the Terms of Insurance
Contracts: A Comparative Stu dy, 39 IND. L.J. 675 at n. 2 for related articles.
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contract terms in various countries and to assess the effectiveness of these
methods in achieving the many purposes sought to be served by insurance
in a modern society.2
An administrative agency can act in three different ways with re-
spect to the contractual relation between insurer and insured:
First, it can lay down general rules prescribing what insurers may
and may not include in policies or may and may not do in settling claims.
Supplementary rules may be made to prescribe procedures. This is an
activity that does not differ basically from what legislatures do.
Second, it can take action to keep unlawful or otherwise injurious
policies from the insurance market by enforcing the general rules pro-
vided in statutes or enunciated in its own "legislative" pronouncements.
This preventive activity is the characteristic administrative task.
Third, it can interfere in individual cases where the situation of a
particular policyholder calls for relief and apply to actual controversies
between companies and individual policyholders rules developed through
such cases or stated in advance either by the legislature or by the agency
or even act without rules, solely on the basis of the apparent "equities" of
the case. Activity of this kind is similar to what courts do. Action with
respect to individual cases may be limited to persuasion and argument;
here the activity is essentially that of a mediator.
All these types of activity exist in both American and European in-
surance supervision. The central activity of the departments is the second.
But all three will be discussed.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER POLICY TERMS IN THE
UNITED STATES
American insurance commissioners were little concerned at first with
public control of the terms of the insurance contract. The introduction
of standard fire policy forms in the 1870's and 1880's was the first ap-
pearance of this problem; the burden of that work was mainly borne by
the companies and trade associations. But insurance department involve-
ment with policy terms has steadily increased until today it is a substantial
part of regulatory activity.
2. In this study traditional legal sources-court opinions, constitutions, statutes, and
official administrative materials-constituted a major part of the raw material. It was
supplemented by study of files and interviews in insurance departments and by reference
to such secondary sources as could be found. The raw material was voluminous. Fur-
thermore, it was chaotic and difficult of access. Only a partial picture emerges from
it, but the importance of the subject makes it useful to say as much as the sources per-
mit. Additional investigation in department files and thorough interviews would have
provided a more complete picture, but a point of diminishing returns seems to have been
reached, at least for the present Perhaps the subject would bear re-examination later.
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A. Organization of Insurance Departments
American departments differ greatly in quality, size, and financial
resources. The number of employees ranges from about 680 in New
York to fewer than a dozen in many small states; annual budgets vary
from approximately $6,000,000 in New York to less than $100,000 in a
dozen or more small states.'
Some states have special sections for the examination of policy
forms. New York has a "policy bureau," Michigan a "policy examina-
tion section." Some states have no special section; in this case life policy
forms may be reviewed by the life actuarial staff. The budget allocation
for review of policy forms is not easy to ascertain precisely in most states.
An NAIC study in 1952 found that expenditures for policy approval
seemed to run from about two to eight per cent of total budgets. New
York, for example, spent about $71,000, or three and a half per cent of
its budget, for its policy examining bureau; Michigan about $16,000
or approximately eight per cent.' Besides the policy examination sec-
tion, other staff members may be involved when improper forms are dis-
covered-for example, during examination of companies or handling of
complaints.5 This may lead to reexamination and sometimes to dis-
approval of policy forms.
The volume of work in the regulation of policy terms by American
departments is immense. Large numbers of insurers are subject to regu-
lation and though there is much uniformity in policy terms, especially
among the bureau and board companies, there is enough variation to cre-
ate a great deal of work. Most applications present only routine prob-
lems to the policy examination section, but a significant number raise
important questions of regulatory policy. One need only think of life
insurance specialty policies to demonstrate how complex and unsettled
the problems can be.' The number of forms processed by each state is
substantial and depends very little on the population of the respective
states." The number is a function partly of the number of companies sell-
3. State Ins. Dep't Statistical Data, Year Ended Dec. 31, 1962, compiled by the
Insurance Industry Committee of Ohio.
4. 1952 NAIC PROCEDINGS 519, 534-40.
5. Special complaint bureaus investigate policyholder complaints in some states.
In California, for example, the Policy Services Bureau assisted in the resolution of
more than 8,400 disputes in 1960. 94TH ANN. RP'T OF THE INS. COMM'R OF THE STATE
oF CALIF. FOR 1961 29.
6. See Kimball and Hanson, The Regulation of Specialty Policies in Life Insitrance,
62 MICH. L. Rv. 167 (1963).
7. In 1962, for example, insurers in New York submitted for approval 10,410 forms
of policies, riders, and endorsements in the fields of life, accident and health, and an-
nuities alone. This number is fairly representative of New York's volume of work since
in 1957 the number was 13,312 and in 1959 it rose to 14,733 because of the 1958 amend-
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ing insurance and partly of the particular approval requirements operative
in the state. It varies greatly with the type of insurance, but it is less de-
pendent on premium volume. Even casual reflection on available statisti-
cal information suggests the inadequacy of budget allocations for policy
form regulation in view of the size of the task and complexity of the prob-
lems. Complaints of most American departments support such a conclu-
sion. They assert that inadequate appropriations, leading to a shortage of
personnel as well as to insufficient salaries, short tenure, quick turnover,
and low levels of insurance knowledge and experience in the staff, make it
impossible to do the regulatory job adequately. Consequently, because of
lack of time the departments can review only superficially the forms
which are submitted for approval.'
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
seeks to bring about uniformity of regulatory practices as well as of in-
surance legislation. Informal discussion of current problems tends to
produce similarity of attitudes. So also does more formal committee de-
liberation on special problems, and special research projects of the NAIC
also seek to produce uniformity among the states in practice.9 In con-
nection with its model standard provisions bill for accident and sickness
insurance the NAIC prepared a widely used Official Guide for the Filing
and Approving of Accident and Health contracts, for the use and in-
formation of departments and insurers. Its main objective was to secure
uniform interpretation and prevent the dissipation of the benefits of
uniform legislation."0 Some states have adopted code provisions that
embody recommendations of the Official Guide."
B. Tlw Activity of Administrative Agencies
1. The Rule-making Activity of Insurance Departments.
ment of the provisions governing accident and health insurance. See 101ST PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE INSURANCE DEPARTIENT TO TH1E 1960 LEGISLATURE
43-44 [hereinafter referred to as N.Y. 101ST PRELIM. REPT.]. Statistics in the 1950
NAIC report showed only 6,865 submissions, 1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS at 535. That re-
port showed that of the 6,865 submissions 861 were either disapproved or withdrawn.
For other New York disapproval figures see N.Y. 101ST PRELIM. REPr. 43, 113.
The 1952 NAIC report showed considerable variation in the number of submissions
from state to state, but the New York number was not strikingly large; Illinois reported
twice as many. 1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS, at 534. Furthermore, over a twelve year
period, from 1950 to 1961 the California Department reviewed 149,000 forms for dis-
ability insurance alone, the number reaching 17,246 in 1961. Calif. Ins. Dept., Ruling
No. 123, File No. RH-84, May 28, 1962, p. 3.
8. 1950 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 543-44.
9. Ibid.
10. See id. at 524, and Follmann, Regulation of Accident and Sickness Insurance, in
ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE 234-38 (McCahan ed. 1954).
11. See Michaelson & Goodridge, Filing and Approval of Policy Forms, in 6 Ex-
AMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 367, 404 (N.Y. State Ins. Dept. ed. 1955).
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Enunciation of general rules has not been a major activity of insur-
ance departments, partly because of constitutional limitations and partly
for purely pragmatic reasons. Some general rules do come out of the
departments, however, whether explicitly enunciated in "legislative"
action or developed as a kind of case law in the process of approving
forms.
a. Constitutional Inhibitions. Broad rule-making authority met
constitutional difficulties at the outset. Early standard fire policy laws
empowered the insurance commissioner or some other public or quasi-
public agency to prepare and promulgate a form of policy that then had to
be used by the insurance companies. Some of these statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional for improper delegation of legislative power.
Thereafter states tended to prescribe standard policies or standard provi-
sions directly by statute.12 Exceptionally, however, legislatures now do
delegate power to prescribe whole policies or policy terms." Most such
delegations would be upheld against constitutional attack at the present
time if the legislature uses the magic words that provide the requisite
"standard" as a guide to the administrative agency. 4
It is interesting that often a delegation of power to prescribe entire
policies is made to some other agency than the insurance department. For
example, the compulsory taxicab insurance statute of the District of
Columbia gives responsibility to the Public Utilities Commission to pre-
scribe the form, terms, and conditions of the insurance policies that will
satisfy the statute; the Superintendent of Insurance then approves the
policy just as he would if the legislature had prescribed the policy."
b. The Scope of Delegation. The New York Insurance law pro-
vides:
The superintendent shall have power to prescribe, in writing, of-
12. Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 690-93.
13. TEXAS INS. CODE Art. 5.35 provides that the regulatory authority "shall make,
promulgate and establish uniform policies of insurance"; use after promulgation is com-
pulsory. VA. CoDE ANN. 38.1-38.2 (1953) authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
standard forms of automobile insurance policies or endorsements which must be used by
all companies writing automobile insurance in the state.
14. Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Carter, 228 S.W.2d 335 (1950), upheld against at-
tack by a policyholder an order of the board requiring use of a $100 deductible provision
for windstorm, hurricane, and hail insurance. No specific statutory authority was
thought necessary to support any particular clause, if the action of the board was rea-
sonable. The case is only the latest of a series in Texas upholding such power. 1
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 101-51 (1958) deals with the state constitutional
law concerning delegation which, more slowly and erratically, is following the lead of
the federal law toward a more realistic position which would de-emphasize the technical
delegation doctrine and put more emphasis on procedural safeguards.
15. D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-301 (1961), interpreted in Bennett v. Amalgamated Cas.
Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 129 (1952).
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ficial regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
chapter; . . b) effectuating any power, given to him under
the provisions of this chapter, to prescribe forms or otherwise
to make regulations. 16
This provision does not create a new power of substantive control but
helps to implement the authorization given in other provisions, of which
there are many. For industrial life insurance, section 163 (4) gives the
superintendent the power to "prescribe reasonable conditions" for the
use of certain optional exclusion clauses." Other sections give him the
power to prescribe or alter standard provisions to meet special needs in
various lines of insurance, including life, accident and health, credit life,
and credit accident and health, and for various special kinds of insurers,
such as cooperative insurance companies, reciprocal insurers, and fraternal
benefit societies.1" The superintendent is also given power by section
169(2), (3) to prescribe standard forms for riders, endorsements, or
supplemental contracts in fire insurance. Often the statutes guide the
superintendent by referring, as in section 459, to existing provisions to
which the regulations shall conform "as far as practicable" or by enum-
erating certain things which are to be contained in the regulations. But
sometimes he has considerable discretion.'"
Other states have similar statutes. The Wisconsin department, un-
der broad authority given both by a general administrative procedure act
and by the insurance statutes, has in recent years issued many rules pre-
scribing or prohibiting particular policy terms,"0 as well as a general rule
establishing a uniform filing and approval requirement for all kinds of
policy forms and fixing the procedure and even setting standards for dis-
approval."' The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act specifies that
rules may be made for three purposes: to interpret the statutes to be en-
forced by the agency, to prescribe forms and procedures necessary to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the statutes, and, finally, to fix general policies
for the exercise of discretion granted to decide individual cases. Im-
position of new substantive requirements is expressly forbidden." Not-
16. N.Y. INs. LAw § 21.
17. For "optional" clauses, see Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 698.
18. N.Y. INs. LAN, §§ 154(7), 236, 237, 368, 415(2), 459, 460.
19. E.g., considerable discretion seems to inhere in the now repealed provisions of
N.Y. VE]HICLE AND TRFFIc LAW § 93-a, interpreted by General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.
Corp. v. Martino, 175 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1958), despite some language purporting to confine
the superintendent.
20. See all recent Wis. Ann. Repts., under heading "Commissioner's Comments:
Administrative Rules."
21. Wis. ArI). CoDE, IN s. 6.05.
22. Wis. STAT. § 227.014 (1963).
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withstanding this restriction, the insurance department has prescribed
terms by rule in credit accident and health insurance without specific
statutory authorization. It is significant that this rule purports to im-
plement and interpret "applicable statutes for the purpose of establishing
minimum requirements for the transaction of credit, accident and health
insurance," while most other rules refer to specific authorizing pro-
visions.28
Under state constitutional law there is often a question respecting
the constitutionality of such rules. More frequently and more appropri-
ately there is often a serious question whether the rules exceed the statu-
tory powers granted to the department. All rules must meet this test re-
gardless of whether there is an express provision to that effect. A ruling
by which the Wisconsin commissioner attempted to achieve uniformity
in accident and health insurance by prescribing the contents of certain
clauses in a manner that went beyond the Standard Provisions Law then
in effect was held beyond his power, which was to administer the law,
not to declare it.24
The Michigan insurance statutes contain only a few special authori-
zations to make rules, mostly concerning filing and approval procedure,
accident and health insurance policies, the combination of life and dis-
ability fnsurance, or credit insurance forms.2" Rules issued under these
sections have been few and not venturesome.2"
c. Rule-making Procedures. The process by which rules are made
varies from state to state; sometimes the insurance department procedures
are assimilated to those of other agencies, through an administrative pro-
cedure act or otherwise, and sometimes not. Often no specific procedures
are prescribed. In California, the Government Code specifies what pro-
cedures shall be followed for the promulgation of regulations by adminis-
trative agencies. When the Insurance Commissioner is specially author-
ized to issue a regulation, reference is normally, made to the applicable
sections of that code. The procedure involves notice to interested
parties and a public hearing. An example of the delegation of rule-making
authority to the commissioner is found in a 1961 statute requiring in-
dividual hospital, medical, or surgical insurance policies to contain either
a schedule of coverages or a brief description of the policy on the face
page and also requiring a reasonable relation between the premium and
23. See Wis. ADM. CODE, INS. 3.16, 6.05.
24. State ex rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 200 N.W. 65 (1924).
25. See MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.13466, .14040 (1957) and Mich. Pub. Acts 1958,
No. 173, § 22.
26. 1954 MicH. ADM. CoDE, R 501.1-.351.
27. See, CALIF. INS. CODE § 10293.
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the benefits. The commissioner was explicitly authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations to establish the standards by which judgment would
be passed on any such policy.28 Pursuant to the authorization he called
a conference in November 1961, at which it was agreed that the "brief
description" requirement was the more urgent. Thereupon a hearing
was held on April 30, 1962, and the commissioner formally promulgated
on May 28, 1962, a regulation of seven sections " concerning the "brief
description" requirement. The benefits-premium relationship presented
more complex and technical problems. At its November 1961 conference
the Health Insurance Association of America undertook to appoint a
representative committee of company actuaries to study the problems.
That committee reported orally in February and formally in writing in
March 1962. On the basis of the latter report the department staff pre-
pared a preliminary draft, dated July 25, which was revised in a later
draft dated August 6. This. resulted in a conference between the depart-
ment and a different representative group of company actuaries. An-
other draft of August 28 resulted, followed by industry comments and a
further draft of September 13. Another informal conference was held
leading to some further changes and a call for a public hearing on October
23. Finally a rule was promulgated at the end of November 1962.0
In New York, the statutory provisions governing the making and
promulgation of insurance department regulations are even now not com-
plete, though in his first regulation after enactment of the general author-
izing statute, in 1939,1 the superintendent distinguished regulations,
orders, and opinions of the department. That regulation has been sup-
plemented by more detailed provisions concerning form and recording.2 2
Usually the department conducts a hearing before a regulation is issued,
giving the affected insurers an opportunity to state opinions and make
objections; newly adopted regulations are made known to the affected in-
surers by circular. 3  In addition, in New York (as well as Michigan
and Wisconsin) the regulations are published in the official Administra-
tive Code; there are also private collections.24 In Michigan, general pro-
28. Ibid.
29. Calif. Ins. Dept., Ruling No. 123, File RH-84, May 28, 1962.
30. Calif. Ins. Dept., Ruling No. 127, File RH-89, November 30, 1962.
31. N.Y. INs. LAw § 21.
32. Regulation No. 1, effective January 1, 1940, OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF THE
CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE OF NEv YORK, Ins. § 1.1 (1962); id. Ins.§ 2.1-2.7.
33. See, c.g., Michelson & Goodridge, op. cit. supra note 11, at 371.
34. E.g., the Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv. covers all states in a loose leaf
publication. Thus the "pigeonhole" argument often advanced against department regu-
lations is less valid than formerly. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN TH1E
UNITED STATES 257 (1927).
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visions for rule-making require filing with the secretary of state and re-
view by the attorney general and a legislative committee;8" Wisconsin
provides similar checks against abuse." The Wisconsin Administrative
Procedure Act also provides for a declaratory judgment to challenge the
validity of a regulation; if the issue arises in certain types of cases the
suit must be stayed while a declaratory judgment is obtained."
Where the commissioner may refuse approval because a policy is
"misleading," or because it does not conform to other such general stand-
ards, the question may arise whether he may use an informal bulletin or
circular letter to state that certain kinds of provisions are misleading and
will be disapproved, instead of issuing a general rule or regulation, with
all of the cumbersomeness that procedure may involve. He would want
to do it as a less burdensome, more flexible, and less permanent way of
issuing a species of "regulation." If he may not use this informal pro-
cedure, as it seems quite possible to argue, then there is a curious anomaly
here. The commissioner may disapprove all such policies that are sub-
mitted to him by virtue of his power to disapprove misleading contracts
without ever giving advance notice, but he cannot state publicly that he
intends to do so, for that would be a rule or regulation, which can be
issued only in a certain way (or perhaps not at all). Perhaps if he merely
stated publicly his view that most such policies are "misleading" and that
companies filing them must be prepared to justify them, there would be
no trouble. If his statutory power is broad enough to enact rules (and
this is not always the case), it is perhaps safer to go through the pro-
cedures of formulating a rule, though how the question of compelling
him to act in a certain way would be raised is not clear if he might have
exercised the same power on each contract as it came along. It is doubt-
ful if any public interest is served by requiring this greater formality.
The problem may arise particularly in connection with a ruling that
a specialty policy provision is inherently misleading or that a coverage
limitation of the kind contained in a special accident policy is inherently
misleading.
While in earlier years agency-promulgated regulations were looked
upon with doubt and suspicion, partly because of unsophisticated applica-
tion of the separation of powers or nondelegation doctrine and partly be-
cause of the lack of procedural safeguards, 8 they have now assumed an
increasingly important position in the pattern of insurance regulation.
35. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(7)-(18) (1961).
36. Wis. STAT. § 227.02-.041 (1963).
37. Wis. STAT. § 227.05 (1963).
38. See DAvis, op. cit. swpra note 14, at 101-08.
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The ever larger number of regulations in the states and the scope of their
contents are impressive evidence of that development.
2. The Rule-enforcing Activity of Insurance Departments.
The various activities of the insurance commissioner have not al-
ways been clearly distinguished. A statute may authorize the commis-
sioner to prepare a uniform policy or rider, it may first prescribe standard
provisions or controlling standards and then authorize him to disapprove
noncomplying policies, or it may authorize him to disapprove policies
without stating what standards are to govern his action. The first in-
stance authorizes rather explicit "legislative" activity, the second only ad-
ministrative implementation of legislative rules. The third seems to per-
mit a kind of case law development of rules.
The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act attempts to delineate
more precisely the rule-making functions of administrative officers and
agencies by saying that a "rule" is not:
• . . an order which is directed to a specifically named person
or to a group of specifically named persons which does not con-
stitute a general class, and the order is served on the person or
persons to whom it is directed by the appropriate means applic-
able thereto. The fact that the named person who is being
regulated serves a group of unnamed persons who will be af-
fected does not make such order a "rule". . . .9
This definition does not seem to recognize the existence of a kind of case-
developed "rule," analogous to our judicially developed case law. How-
ever, the commissioner's action will be deemed arbitrary unless there is a
tendency to act uniformly, i.e., develop "rules." Therefore, there is at
least a tacit recognition of the case-developed "rule,"-a kind of insur-
ance department common law.
Where a statute requires standard provisions, the statute is often ex-
pressly self-executing, and the provisions are incorporated into the policy
by the courts as if they had been written in; provisions contrary to the
law are treated as void."0 Under traditional doctrines the courts will so
interpret the policy even without statutory prescription (that is, private
law effect is given the provisions). However, the court can only act in
litigated cases. This is not sufficient protection; many policyholders
would acquiesce in illegal policies and unfair treatment in ignorance of
their rights or because they would not take the trouble or could not pay
39. Wxs. STAT. § 227.01(5) (1963).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Ixs. LAW § 143; MicHi. STAT. ANN. § 24.13468 (1957); Wis.
STAT. § 204.31(3) (i) (1963).
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the cost of a lawsuit. The commissioner's preventive activity helps to
keep illegal policies from being used without waiting for litigation.
a. Scope of Control. States vary widely in the extent to which
they regulate different types of insurance. New York controls life and
accident and health insurance forms but exercises very limited control
over fire and casualty policies. On the other hand, title insurance policies
must be filed with the superintendent "for his information.""' Such
filing provides little control, though presumably flagrant violations of
law could be dealt with under general powers, and publicity is always
available as a sanction. The Michigan department has statutory power
to review all kinds of "basic" insurance forms, as well as riders, endorse-
ments, and some applications.2 Wisconsin provides by statute for con-
trol of life and accident and health insurance policies, as do most states;
and recently by administrative rule the commissioner has also subjected
most other lines to a general filing requirement, assuming power to dis-
approve objectionable forms.4"
Most statutes fail to distinguish between a standard form for gen-
eral use and one specially designed for an individual contract. Typical
language provides that "no policy . . .shall be issued . . unless the
form . . . thereof shall have been filed. . . ." It has been held, how-
ever, that slight variations in the language of non-promissory portions
of a rider do not necessitate a new filing.4" On the other hand, the Michi-
gan requirement for every "basic policy form" does not apply to "policies,
riders, indorsements or forms of unique character designed for and used
with relation to insurance upon a particular subject. . . ."  Moreover,
the commissioner has discretion to exempt "any insurance document or
form or type thereof . . . the filing and approval of which are, in his
opinion, not desirable or necessary for the protection of the public." 7
Generally speaking, the authority to review policy forms does not
extend to supplementary forms such as the application. A federal court,
applying Minnesota law, rejected the contention that under a statute re-
41. Life, accident, and health insurance forms are scrutinized with great care, N.Y.
INs. LAw § 154 (containing elaborate provisions specifying when policy forms may be
disapproved). For title insurance, see § 438. Endorsements and special forms for fire
insurance require approval. § 169(3), (4). The basic fire form does not, but is a
standard statutory policy. § 168(5), (6). In some lines forms need formal approval,
without special standards for evaluation other than compliance with the statute. § 255
(various medical and hospital indemnity contracts), § 408 (insurance for the life of
property).
42. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.12236, .12238, .12242 (1957).
43. Wis. STAT. §§ 204.31(1) (g), 206.17 (1963) ; Wis. ADM. CODE, INS. 6.05.
44. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 154(1), 236, 408.
45. Onstad v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 Minn. 546, 33 N.W.2d 691 (1948).
46. Mlcii. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.12236, .12236(4) (1957).
47. Ibid.
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quiring policy forms to be filed, an application form must also be filed
in order for it to be introduced in evidence where another statute provided
that no statement of the insured would avoid the policy unless it was con-
tained in a written application, a copy of which was endorsed upon or
attached to the policy. The company was held free to ask what questions
it liked in its application form without submitting the latter to the com-
missioner."s Likewise, a requirement of approval of all "contracts of in-
surance" was held by the Kansas Supreme Court not to apply to a pre-
mium receipt admittedly not a part of the insurance contract; the com-
missioner was not permitted to disapprove a receipt form containing
"objectionable language."49
b. Prior Approval versus Subsequent Disapproval. Review may
take place prior to use of a form or after it is already in use. Complete
protection of policyholders requires thorough and competent prior review.
Commonly the statutes forbid use of any form requiring approval until
after it has been expressly approved. But indefinite suspension is nor-
mally forbidden; the commissioner "shall, within a reasonable time after
the filing of any form requiring approval, notify the insurer filing the
same of his approval or his disapproval of such form.""0  Most of the
states have fixed a waiting period during which the policy may not be
issued and in which the department may review the form and take af firm-
ative action to approve or disapprove it. Either express approval or ex-
piration of the period without disapproval authorizes use of the form.
The provision replacing formal approval by lapse of time is commonly
known as a "deemer" clause."' The deemer clause is useful to prevent or
discourage overburdened insurance departments from delaying action un-
duly and unnecessarily. 2 Theoretically it enables insurers to introduce
new forms without having to wait unreasonably long for affirmative ac-
tion when the department is not willing or able to make a prompt and
thorough examination. When in 1952 a study was made for the NAIC
of the control of life and accident and health insurance forms, only one
state admitted enough delay in the processing of policy forms for the
deemer clause to be operative. Several departments said they processed
48. First Trust Co. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 48 (1935).
49. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 170 Kan. 64, 223 P.2d 713 (1950).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW, § 154(1).
51. Mice. STAT. AwN. § 24.12236 (1957) : "Failure of the commissioner to act with.
in 30 days after submittal shall constitute approval." Wis. ADM. CODE, INS. 6.05 re-
quires filing which shall become "effective" after 15 or 30 days unless the commissioner
approves earlier. See also Wis. STAT., §§ 204.31(3) (g), 206.17 (1963); Mich. Pub.
Acts. 1958, No. 173, §§ 12-16. For length of deemer period in disability insurance, see
1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 519, 529.
52. See, e.g., Patterson, op. cit. mutpra note 34, at 265-66.
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the forms within the deemer period while the rest of the thirty-eight states
responding to the questionnaire said they acted in periods ranging from
"immediate" or "five to ten minutes" to two weeks.5" It seems clear that
the deemer clause exerts pressure for a prompt review. There is much
reason to think, however, that the review tends to be perfunctory. Once
the deemer period has expired or approval has been given, further surveil-
lance is unlikely, absent policyholder complaints or court decisions to
stimulate reconsideration, since the company is entitled to act on an as-
sumption of approval. The net result of deemer clauses may thus be less
careful control than would be exercised under a subsequent disapproval
system where fewer elements of estoppel are present. Some states mini-
mize this danger by providing for an extension of the deemer period by
order of the commissioner."4 The same effect is achieved in Michigan
simply by notice to the insurer that the form is still under consideration
and that issuance is not advisable. Of course, the companies are in a dif-
ficult position, despite expiration of the deemer period, if the department
chooses to ignore any considerations of estoppel in transgressing the time
limit for scrutiny of the form.
The deemer provision has been used more frequently in recent NAIC
drafting activity. Since legislation concerning life insurance developed
earlier and in the individual states, deemer provisions are less frequent
there than in accident and health, where the uniform statutes played a
larger role.55
Simultaneous existence of general and special provisions, enacted at
different times, some with and some without deemer clauses, produces
frequent conflict among the provisions, to be resolved in the process of
statutory construction."
c. The Technique of Control. The procedure for examining and
approving policy forms differs from state to state. As a rule it is in-
formal and not always the same; however, a few states have detailed and
precise provisions, either in the statutes or in administrative regulations."
53. 1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 519, 544.
54. See e.g., Wis. ADm. CODE, INS. 6.05(2) (c).
55. Cf. 1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 529, 532. The Uniform Code for Organization
and Supervision of Fraternal Benefit Societies, § 21, 1955 NAIC PROCEEDINGS II 301,
309, leaves an option to the states. The new model bill for credit life and credit ac-
cident and health insurance provides only a deemer clause. 1958 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I
106, 110. Mich. Pub. Acts 1958, No. 173, § 14 follows the model bill with a deemer
clause, N.Y. INs. LAW, § 154(7) requires approval, while Wis. STAT. §§ 204.31(3) (g),
206.63(5) (1963) adapt the rules to correspond to ordinary health and accident forms.
56. For instance, there is an apparent conflict between MicH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12236
(the general provision) and the special provisions of §§ 24.12236, .12242, .13606, .13620,
.13638, .14040, .14430.
57. E.g., Wis. ADMr. CODE, INs. 6.05. In general see 1952 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 532.
Field studies were made in two American states by Mr. Pfennigstorf.
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A first comparison is usually made of the submitted form with the statute
and with applicable regulations to see whether formal requirements are
met, whether the policies contain the required standard provisions, and
whether they contain any prohibited provisions. Where a reasonable re-
lation of premiums and benefits is required the form must be accom-
panied by rate schedules, experience statistics, and other pertinent data.
Rules and statutes now quite generally provide that the commissioner
shall inform the insurer of his objections and that the insurer shall be en-
titled to a formal hearing, and this is also sometimes done even when the
statute does not specifically require it." Approval does not require formal
action, however, and a policyholder may not question the validity of other-
wise legal exceptions or other defenses solely because the policy was ap-
proved routinely by a subordinate in the department and had no special
consideration by the commissioner himself."
The larger departments tend to proceed somewhat more formally,
and then any tendency toward informality seems to be deemed worthy of
note. Thus when the New York department called a hearing on umbrella
liability policies in the spring of 1963 and asked for informal expressions
of opinion from insurer representatives on the propriety of certain clauses
then being submitted in such policy forms, the nature of the proceeding
seemed a new enough practice to produce editorial comment in the insur-
ance press."0 But one should not expect such unstructured hearings ex-
cept when the department needs help in its preliminary thinking about
standards for approval. Once it has formulated its position, such a
meeting would be anomalous.
Quite often there are informal preliminary discussions about the ad-
missibility of certain clauses."' In doubtful cases there may be long ne-
gotiations, several revisions, and substantial research. 2 On legal ques-
tions the department counsel or the state attorney general may be con-
sulted. For example, in 1960, the Illinois Director of Insurance sub-
58. For applicable administrative procedure acts, see, e.g., Vxs. STAT. §§ 227.01-.26
(1963). Officials are often guided by manuals and internal regulations. See, e.g., Mi-
chaelson & Goodridge, Filing and Approval of Policy Forms, in 6 EXAmINATION OF IN-
SURANCE CO-MPANIES 367-423. Larson v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 64 So.2d 322 (Fla.
1953) considers the adequacy of notice of a hearing to review disapproval of policy.
59. Krug v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 848 (1957) (upholding an ordi-
nary suicide clause against attack by the policyholder).
60. Jour. of Commerce, April 5, 1963, p. 8; National Underwriter, May 3, 1963,
p. 4.
61. See Michaelson & Goodridge, op. cit. supra note 58, at 373; Shank v. Fidelity
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 221 Minn. 124, 129, 21 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1945) (upon request of
insurer, commissioner made suggestion of a policy form for aviation exclusion rider).
The Wisconsin regulation expressly allows submission in typed or printer's proof for-
mat for an advisory opinion prior to the formal filing. Wis. ADM. CODE, INS. 6.05 (4) (c).
62. See Michaelson & Goodridge, supra note 58, at 378.
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mitted to the attorney general the question whether filings of single limit
automobile policies complied with the financial responsibility laws. 3 In
Michigan, problems of statutory interpretation and other legal questions
which arise in the course of policy review and which the policy examiner
hesitates to decide alone are first discussed with the appropriate division
head; if doubt remains, the question is submitted to the commissioner,
who may consult an assistant attorney general attached to his staff. Only
a few legal problems actually reach the attorney; he does not participate
as a matter of course in conferences concerning new forms of coverage."'
Formal provision is rarely made for hearing from policyholders,
though any strong and well-organized group of policyholders would have
no difficulty in being heard. Consultation sometimes does take place,
however, perhaps more often on rate questions than on policy terms."
In the few situations in which the department has power to prescribe
policy terms, a special problem sometimes arises with respect to existing
contracts. Of course there could be no narrowing of coverage without
the consent of the insured, but when the change is a liberalization, the
department may wish to give existing policyholders the advantage of the
improvement. In one such case, when the new family automobile policy
was developed, the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission issued a bul-
letin instructing companies of the effective date of the new policy and
directing the companies to interpret existing policies as affording the
broader protection. The companies agreed by letter so to construe the
policies, and the court upheld the broader interpretation when one com-
pany wished to back out.6"
d. Basic Principles of the Approval Process. The criteria that
guide the commissioner in his decision to approve or disapprove a form
are important objects of our inquiry. In the American context it is dif-
ficult to ascertain the criteria so far as they develop from practice within
the departments, for they are seldom explicitly enunciated for the record.
However, a search of the files of insurance departments, a look at pub-
lished regulations or circulars, and a reading of court cases reviewing de-
partment action make it possible to suggest some prevalent criteria. Some
63. 1960 Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv., Ill. 1, 8 (Illinois attorney general
opinion of April 22 and August 12, 1960). See also 1961 Weekly Underwriter Ins.
Dep't Serv., Wis. 15 (Wisconsin attorney general opinion advising the commissioner that
he might disapprove as "indefinite and vague" an accident and health policy form ex-
cluding coverage "if the insured does not incur an unconditional requirement to pay").
64. In California anyone affected by an order of the commissioner may request
that the question of its legality be submitted to the attorney general. CALIF. INS. CODE §
12923. For an illustration see 1959 Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv. Cal. 39.
65. See, e.g., United Medical Serv. v. Holz, 161 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (1957).
66. Lejene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 107 So.2d 509 (La. 1958).
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are derived from statutes; a few appear to be based on general policy
grounds. We first illustrate the latter, so far as they appeared in the ma-
terial examined. They are hard to formulate with precision, of course,
since they are seldom enunciated at all. They arise mostly when the de-
partment has the task of implementing statutes providing for approval
with no indicated standards or with standards so general as to be mean-
ingless, such as that of New York Insurance Law section 169(4), which
permits the superintendent to disapprove "if he deems it for the best in-
terest of the insuring public."
There seems to be, for example, an inclination for insurance depart-
ments to encourage enlargement of coverage and to discourage its re-
striction. The Louisiana handling of the new family automobile policy
discussed above illustrates the tendency. Though seldom if ever based
on a legislative mandate, such an inclination may be related to statutory
language and justified by the department by reference to such an assumed
mandate. Thus in Maine, the commissioner disapproved an automobile
policy which restricted coverage to the named insured and in other ways.
Keying his reasons to statutory language authorizing him to disapprove
a policy which "is misleading or capable of a construction which is un-
fair to the assured or the public," he said the policy was misleading and
unfair because it did not provide coverage in a number of specified cases
where "the assured would normally expect coverage to exist." It did not
matter to him that the premium was also decreased so that there did not
seem to be an unreasonable relation of premiums charged to benefits con-
ferred by the policy. The policy contained an admonition on its cover,
in red letters, that it was a limited policy that would not satisfy the fi-
nancial responsibility act, if the policyholder were subject to that statute.
Despite the lack of a clear mandate in the law, the court upheld the com-
missioner's denial of approval, stating that his reasons were partly valid
and partly invalid. In a dictum the court declined to approve the commis-
sioner's view that a policy so narrow as the one in question was not per-
missible; the legislature had not prescribed broad coverage and apparently
the court thought it would require approval of even a very narrow policy
if it were not misleading in any respect. It is interesting, however, that
when put to the test in this case, the court found grounds on which to up-
hold the administrator's action."
Unless there is good reason to justify them, clauses that exclude por-
tions of the coverage that would otherwise fall within the general terms
of the insuring clause tend to be disapproved. For example, the Michi-
gan department has disapproved the "intentional injury" exclusion in ac-
67. American Fid. Co. v. Mahoney, 157 Me. 507, 174 A.2d 446 (1961).
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cident policies or double indemnity riders in life insurance. To insurer
objections, the answer has been that there seemed to be no adequate actu-
arial or public policy reason for exclusion of intentional injury not pro-
voked by the insured. The wish of the company did not provide adequate
grounds for the exclusion.
Again, a proposal by companies to attach a nuclear hazard exclusion
to the statutory standard fire policy led to extensive discussions before
an NAIC committee. Only an inclination to resist contractions in cover-
age could make it necessary to discuss such a question at great length."5
However, inconsistent objectives are not fully overridden-the goal
of freedom of contract remains a strong motivating force. In 1962, de-
spite evident reluctance, the West Virginia department approved a modi-
fication of the replacement cost coverage that contracted protection some-
what. The coverage still exceeded that required by the statutory fire
policy and the remaining benefits seemed reasonable in relation to pre-
miums. Freedom of contract was still a living force with the depart-
ment, which could find no basis for disapproval.69
Some principles of insurance public policy given explicit statutory
recognition in contexts other than form approval are frequently applied
by departments in the approval of policy forms, even if the statutes have
not enunciated their applicability. Examples are the requirement of rea-
sonableness in the relation of premiums to benefits, equity or non-
discrimination, and the solvency or solidity of the insurance companies.7
In addition to criteria developed by the departments, numerous cri-
teria are stated in statutes. A common standard is that the form must
comply with the statutes or with the law. 1 Non-insurance laws may be
involved, as when policies are disapproved in New York because they con-
tain authorization for the insurer to obtain confidential information from
the policyholder's physician in violation of statute." Explicit statement
of a standard of conformity to law seems superfluous; if the commis-
sioner has any power to disapprove policies this would be sufficient im-
plied basis for doing so.
The commissioner must take into consideration the substantive as
well as the formal requirements of the law." On the other hand, one
68. Weekly Underwriter, Dec. 20, 1958, p. 1238.
69. West Virginia Ins. Dept. News Bulletin, August 1962, p. 2.
70. See, e.g., Jour. of Commerce, April 5, 1963, p. 8.
71. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW, § 154; Micra. STAT. ANN. § 24.12236(2) (1957);
Wis. ADM. CODE, INs. 6.05(5) (b) (the latter also adds rules of the insurance depart-
ment).
72. See Michaelson & Goodridge, op. cit. supra note 58, at 387, applying Civil Prac-
tice Act, § 354. Cf. text accompanying note 15 supra.
73. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 181, 85 N.E. 407 (1908).
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case does say that a statute providing for approval "as to form" gives
the commissioner no power to review the substantive contents of a pol-
icy." The case is weakened by the fact that the court declined to issue an
injunction against the commissioner's order to discontinue the use of the
form, since the contents of the policy actually were contrary to the statute
and void. This seems the likely result in all similar cases, especially since
the commissioner usually has broadly stated general powers to enforce
the law.
A statute that permits disapproval when the policy does not con-
form to generally accepted insurance practices"e seems of the same type
since it merely incorporates business practice as a statutory standard.
The uncertainty in such a formulation gives much freedom to the
commissioner.
In the related article on legislative control, we distinguished between
substantive and formal control, defining the latter in terms of the effort
to provide to the policyholder full and reliable information about the
coverage of his policy. Some statutory standards governing the com-
missioner's approval of policy forms thus seek to ensure mainly that the
policyholder is informed-they seek clarity, in order that policies may not
mislead or be deceptive. For example, the California commissioner may
not approve a disability policy
if he finds that it contains any provision, or has any label,
description of its contents, title, heading, backing, or other in-
dication of its provisions which is unintelligible, uncertain, am-
biguous, or abstruse, or likely to mislead a person to whom the
policy is offered, delivered, or issued."6
This provision, comprehensively as its drafter tried to formulate it,
seeks only one thing, clarity in communication. Presumably this is an
objective of all insurance departments, whether or not it receives a statu-
tory formulation.
Other statutes, while seeking clarity as the main goal, include some
substantive elements. Thus, the Michigan commissioner may disapprove
any policy if it
contains inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading clauses, or con-
tains exceptions and conditions that unreasonably or deceptively
74. Great United Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Palmer, 358 Ill. 276, 193 N.E. 146 (1934)
(upholding constitutionality of statute as thus construed).
75. NEVADA REV. STAT. § 690.030 (1963).
76. CALIF. INs. CoDE § 10291.5.
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affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage
of the policy.7
The New York superintendent may disapprove any accident and health
policy that
contains provisions which encourage misrepresentation or are
unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, deceptive. .71
The latter formula is popular and extensively used in statutes.70 Some
regulations, such as those used in Wisconsin for all kinds of insurance
forms except life and disability, specify the same standard.8"
Such broad language leaves much to administrative practice and the
development of a kind of case law. For instance, the NAIC discussed
the question whether a policy purporting to insure against so-called "dread
diseases" was misleading.8' The Wisconsin attorney general advised the
commissioner that he might prohibit the use of a clause in accident and
health policies which excluded coverage for hospital and other charges
"if the insured does not incur an unconditional requirement to pay there-
fore," since the clause is "so indefinite and vague that it is susceptible to
different interpretations and misunderstandings as to whether the policy
covers the insured and will pay the hospital and other charges if he shall
be hospitalized in a state, county or other governmental institution, for
which the insured, his relative, or guardian may have to pay." The attor-
ney general thought such a general provision "could easily mislead or
deceive the insured."' 2
As noted, the above statutory formulations contain substantive as
well as formal standards. A policy must not be "unjust, unfair, inequit-
able," or "unfairly discriminatory." It must not "unreasonably affect
the risk purported to be assumed." In Maine, the commissioner may dis-
approve if the policy "is misleading or capable of a construction which
77. MicH. STAT. AxN. J 24.12236(2) (1957).
78. N.Y. INs. LAW § 154(1). For certain special forms of supplemental contracts
or endorsements § 154(4) authorizes approval if they contain anything likely to mislead
the policyholder.
79. See, e.g., Wis. STAT., § 204.31(3) (g) (1963) (disability) ; MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 24.12242(2) (1957) (disability) ; 1958 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I 106, 110 (model credit life
and disability act), adopted by Mich. Pub. Acts 1958, No. 173, § 13; Wis. STAT., §
204.32(4) (1963) (franchise disability), and 206.63(5) (credit life), both of which re-
fer to § 204.31 (3) (g).
80. Wis. ADA. CODE, INs. 6.05(5) (a). "A form shall be disapproved if it contains
a provision which is unfairly discriminatory, inequitable, misleading, deceptive, or en-
courages misrepresentation of the coverage."
81. See 1950 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 54-59.
82. 1961 Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv. Wis. 15. For a curious case where
policies were disapproved as misleading because they gave undue prominence to exclu-
sions and exceptions, see Mooney, Approval of Policy Formis, 1958 INs. LAW J. 71, 72.
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is unfair to the assured or the public .. ." In New York the super-
intendent has power under section 154(1) of the Insurance Law to dis-
approve a life insurance policy form
if in his judgment its issuance would be prejudicial to the in-
terests of its policyholders or members or it contains provisions
which are unjust, unfair or inequitable.
These broad and ambiguous terms can acquire concrete meaning
only through the development of a fixed jurisprudence through insur-
ance department practice. For example, in a recent circular letter the
New York department expressed its opinion on a proposed rider form
for group life and group disability insurance under which the policy-
holder would be obliged not to pay fixed premiums in advance but to re-
imburse at the end of the contract period the amount actually paid by the
insurer for claims during the period, up to a certain maximum, plus an
administrative and contingency charge. The letter stated that the method
of subsequent payment conflicted with established principles concerning
reserves and required assets and concluded, in language borrowed from
the statute, that the rider was
not approvable by this Department because:
(1) the issuance of the life insurance benefit thereunder, in the
judgment of the Superintendent of Insurance, would encourage
misrepresentation and be prejudicial to the interests of policy-
holders generally and the form contains provisions which are
unjust, unfair and inequitable; and
(2) to the extent that accident and health insurance benefits are
involved, the form contains provisions which encourage mis-
representation and are unjust, unfair, inequitable, and contrary
to the public policy of this State.
8 4
Another example of such case law comes from Michigan, where the
department has objected to clauses in life policies which restrict the
insurer's liability in cases of death caused by injuries intentionally in-
flicted by another person. The department admitted that it had pre-
viously approved such clauses, that they were in use in the other states
with the approval of insurance departments, and that courts had treated
them as valid. Nevertheless, the department asserted that the exclusion
was not warranted actuarially and refused to approve it on the ground
83. MfAiNE REv. STAT. ch. 60, § 6 (1954). See text accompanying note 67 supra for
discussion of a case purportedly based on the statute.
84. 1961 Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv. N.Y. 13-14. Cf. N.Y. INs. LAw
§ 154.
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that it "unreasonably affected the risk purported to be assumed." 5  In
the end a compromise was reached: the department approved a clause
excluding intentionally inflicted injuries provoked by the insured.
In both the New York and Michigan cases the departments stated
the facts and their objectionable implications and then, to give the deci-
sion a legal basis, copied the words of the statute without adequately re-
lating the one to the other. Even so, this does provide some guidelines
to prediction of future decisions of the same departments. Even judicial
case law could do little more to settle the meaning of such ambiguous
terms. Fortunately ambiguity is found most often in disability insur-
ance, where there are also standard provisions laws covering the more
important clauses.
The necessity of deciding whether provisions conform "in sub-
stance" or are "more favorable to the insured" also presents problems
that are often difficult and that give considerable discretion to the com-
missioner. But despite ambiguity, practice of a department can create
predictable rules. It is true that a court might overturn such rules if
asked to do so; that will seldom happen because insurers find it easier to
acquiesce.
One particular substantive standard which is very common author-
izes disapproval if "the benefits provided therein are not reasonable in
relation to the premium charge .... ,86 This requirement establishes a
form of rate regulation."7 A proper decision by the commissioner in these
cases depends on competent actuarial work and sound economic judg-
ment. In determining whether the relation is reasonable the commis-
sioner is usually required to consider the loss experience of the applicant
insurer, which is bound to submit its experience statistics and other per-
tinent data.8" Some commissioners have announced standards which, if
met, create a presumption that the benefits are reasonable." There have
been recent efforts to establish a loss ratio of fifty per cent as a standard
in credit insurance laws in the absence of peculiar circumstances. 0
85. The department was applying MIcH. STAT. AN. § 24.12236(2) (1956).
86. See, e.g., the model bill for credit life and disability insurance, 1958 NAIC PRo-
CEEDINGS I 106, 110; CALIF. INS. CODE § 10293(c); MIcH. ANN. STAT. § 24.12242
(1957) (group disability); Mich. Pub. Acts, 1958, No. 173 § 13 (credit insurance);
N.Y. INs. LAW § 154(1) (disability); Wis. STAT. § 204.31(3) (g) (1963) (disability).
87. The clause originated in the first years after the promulgation of the McCarran
Act. Follmann, Regulation of Accident and Sickness Insuratwe, in ACCIDENT AND SICK-
NEss INSURANCF, at 254-55; KLINE, REGULATION oF MAn. ORDER ACCIDENT AND H-ALTH
INSURANCE 38-39 (1949).
88. See, e.g, Wis. ADm. CODE, INs. 2.06(7) (c), 3.16(7) (c).
89. 1959 Weekly Underwriter Ins. Dep't Serv. Neb. 3; id., N.J. 1,7; id., W. Va. 1,5.
90. See, e.g., 1960 NAIC PROcEEDINGS II 478; Insurance Advocate, Jan. 2, 1965, at26 (S. Car.).
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The elimination of diversity is an objective that insurance depart-
ments might reasonably seek. Uniformity would simplify the tasks of
the departments, make it easier for policyholders to judge the compara-
tive values of policies, and tend to suppress the kind of unfair competitive
practice that depends on the use of "gimmicks." Generally, however,
commissioners on the American scene have not seriously urged a require-
ment of uniformity, aside from the statutory standard fire policy and
the standard provisions laws. But it is not an unknown goal. The Wis-
consin commissioner once tried to impose substantive uniformity on dis-
ability insurers; similarly the Ohio superintendent tried to require com-
panies to adopt certain definitions espoused by the NAIC. In neither
case was the court sympathetic."' On the other hand, the West Virginia
department has promulgated a standard hospital service contract, and in
various states there are standard automobile policies." Automobile poli-
cies approach uniformity everywhere, with department encouragement
and industry self-discipline each playing a role in the approach to uni-
formity. 3  Standardization is an objective that not only departments
might wish to achieve. Insurance companies, too, and even brokers may
gain from it, despite its disadvantages in tending to produce rigidity and
inflexibility in the market.9" However, it has not generally been an im-
portant objective in the United States. In fact, the effort to achieve
uniformity within states is often tied closely to NAIC efforts to achieve
national uniformity.
e. The Extent of Discretion-Judicial Review. The commissioner
is not an automaton, but neither may he act altogether as he wishes. The
extent of his freedom, or "discretion," 9 is determined by many factors
difficult to trace. The limits of discretion-in-law are defined by the
courts in determining the scope and manner of judicial review. How-
ever, since even when they are justified insurers tend to be reluctant to
challenge the commissioner, the limits of discretion-in-fact are set by
other factors and especially by the commissioner's self-restraint. One
may speculate that while a lawyer-commissioner is likely to perceive
dearly and conform reasonably well to the court-defined outer limits
91. State cx rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 200 N.W. 65 (1924) ; Mutual
Benefit Ins. Co. v. Younger, 28 Ohio N.P.N.S. 368 (1931).
92. NV. Va. Ins. Dep't, Regulation 57 HS-2 (Nov. 29, 1957) ; Pope, Proposed Uni-
form Automobile Policy, in 1934-35 ABA SEcr. or INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 23; Donovan,
National Standard Provisions for Casualty Policies, in 1949 ABA SECT. OF INS. LAW
PRocrEnNGS 101, 103. In Massachusetts, where automobile liability insurance is compul-
sory, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34B (1954) provides for promulgation of a standard
policy by the commissioner.
93. See Donovan, op. cit. snpra note 92.
94. See, e.g., National Underwriter, May 3, 1963, pp. 4, 51.
95. See, e.g., Patterson, op. cit. supra note 34, at 259-60.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of his power, a lay commissioner may either scorn the legalistic approach
and use all the power he can muster to enlarge his discretion, except so
far as he is restrained by the courts or by his legal advisers, or, on the
other hand, give a more literal obedience to the limits of discretion stated
in his enabling statutes and interpretive cases and opinions than a lawyer
would. This decisive personal element is too individual to be explored
further here, but its relevance must be appreciated for realistic under-
standing of any aspect of the regulatory activity of insurance departments.
Problems of discretion and judicial review in insurance regulation
are usually also problems of general administrative law; there is thus no
reason to deal fully with them here. One could scarcely do so using only
insurance cases, which are few and often agree with the commissioner
on the merits, thus being equivocal on the question of discretion.9"
Some general observations are worth noting here. Where discretion
is given to the commissioner, the scope of review of a commissioner's
decision is limited since discretion and review have a reciprocal relationY
To be sure, the court may and should rely heavily on the expert knowl-
edge, experience, and sound judgment of the commissioner; and often
statutes specifically so instruct.9" Conversely, a court may be confident
that in knowledge and experience it is superior to the commissioner and
disregard his determinations; occasionally a statute may expressly author-
ize the court to do so. Thus, in one provision,9 the court is instructed to
enforce the policy as if it were written in the statutory language "unless
the court finds that its actual provisions were more favorable to policy-
holders at the date when the policy was issued." Despite references in
related sections to the commissioner's "opinion" or "judgment" implying
absolute discretion, the provision seems to deny any weight on collateral
attack to the superintendent's approval.'
When a court is not given such latitude in reviewing a commis-
sioner's determination it still has to decide whether to overturn the com-
96. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 289 Mass. 363,
194 N.E. 110 (1935); Commercial Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 104 Utah 41, 137
P.2d 656 (1943).
97. See, e.g., Wis. STAT., § 227.20(1) (1963), focusing mainly on unlawful pro-
cedure and arbitrary or capricious action.
98. See, e.g., Wis. STAT., § 227.20(2) (1963). That the decision of the commis-
sioner "is entitled to much weight," see White v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 203 Miss.
752, 765, 34 So.2d 234, 236 (1948). It is "somewhat persuasive of its compliance with
the statute." Drogula v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 248 Mich. 645, 648, 227 N.W. 692, 693
(1929).
99. N.Y. INs. LAW § 143(3).
100. In Franklin v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 81, 80 N.E.2d 746
(1948), the New York Court of Appeals held a suicide clause in a life insurance policy
to be "obviously less favorable" to the insured and declined to give effect to the super-
intendent's approval.
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missioner's exercise of discretion. Often a court may be influenced to
some extent by the practical needs of the regulator. On the other hand,
it may sometimes rely unduly on cases which deal with a different
problem, such as a licensing or insolvency problem, where other considera-
tions should be controlling.'"' More importantly, however, the court's
power to review decisions of a commission will depend on its interpreta-
tion of the extent of discretion the language of the statute allows the
commissioner.
If a statute provides that policy forms need the commissioner's ap-
proval, without stating any standards, it is not clear whether the legisla-
ture intended to give him broad discretion or to deny him any. Conse-
quently, court response to this situation has been quite varied. A New
Hampshire decision'0 ' seems to concede almost unlimited discretion to
the commissioner. On the other hand, an Oklahoma court ruled that
while such a statute confers wide discretion upon the commissioner, it is
the duty of the courts to determine the limits of that discretion.' Simi-
larly, in Ohio the court said that a commissioner's discretion must be ex-
ercised reasonably and that disapproval must be based upon a violation
of the statutes.'' By contrast both the Michigan Supreme Court and
the Wisconsin Supreme Court have interpreted similar statutes to give
little if any discretion to the commissioner. The Michigan court seemed
to regard the duty to approve or disapprove policies as ministerial, hold-
ing that the commissioner inust approve a life policy which complies with
a statute enumerating both required standard provisions and prohibited
provisions.' The Wisconsin court went even further and expressly said
that allowing the commissioner to impose requirements in addition to
those set forth in the statute would unconstitutionally vest him with legis-
101. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 71 Okla. 59, 175 Pac. 43 (1917-18),
strongly relies on North British & Mercantile Co. v. Craig, 106 Term. 621, 62 S.W. 155
(1901), where an insurer's license was involved.
102. Continental Cas. Co. v. Buxton, 88 N.H. 447, 191 Atl. 1 (1937). All policies
written pursuant to a motor vehicle financial responsibility law needed his approval.
The court held that exclusion from coverage of injuries sustained by passenger guests
of the renter of an automobile was valid if approved and void if not approved.
103. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 71 Okla. 59, 175 Pac. 43 (1917-18).
The court sustained the commissioner's disapproval of a form, initially insisting that
the insurer must allege arbitrariness or fraud. On rehearing, the court qualified its
language to retain the power to define the limits of the commissioner's discretion but
sustained the result reached in its earlier decision.
104. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Younger, 28 Ohio N.P.N.S. 368 (1931). How-
ever, the court dismissed the insurer's petition for an injunction because the title of the
policy was misleading.
105. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 151 Mich. 610, 115
N.W. 707 (1908).
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lative power."'
Occasionally statutes seem to confer broad discretionary power on
the commissioner by using ambiguous standards like "unjust," "mislead-
ing," "substantially the same," or "more favorable to policyholders,"
which surely are intended to give such freedom. Even more pointed, the
New York superintendent may disapprove forms of supplemental con-
tracts covering loss of rents, profits, use, or occupancy in connection with
a fire policy whenever he "deems it for the best interest of the insuring
public." Unlike those above, this is not an ambiguous term for him to
interpret, but one that expressly gives him wide discretion. Only on con-
stitutional grounds could a court restrict this authority to specific viola-
tions of the statute or, in the absence of .arbitrariness, substitute its own
opinion for that of the superintendent. 1 '
When the statutes enumerate specific grounds for disapproval, one
may ask (1) whether the commissioner is free to disapprove a policy that
meets all expressed requirements, and (2) whether he has power to ap-
prove a noncomplying form.
There is authority for the proposition that forms which do comply
with the law must be approved-that the commissioner cannot lawfully
refuse approval for his own reasons.' His power is confined by the
terms of the law. But to carry this doctrine out fully would make the
commissioner a mere clerk.
Of course, the commissioner has no discretion to approve when spe-
cific statutory requirements are not met, if the statute is sufficiently ex-
plicit to that effect."0 9 If the company relies on approval it is sure to be
disappointed." 0  However, the same result is not necessarily reached in
106. State ex rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 477-78, 200 N.W. 65, 73
(1924). The courts seem to be more liberal than they formerly were in applying the
requirement that the authorizing statute must fix general standards and leave only de-
tails to the determination of the agency. 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TRnATISE 148-
51 (1958).
107. N.Y. INs. LAw § 169(4). But see Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pink, 288
N.Y. 359, 43 N.E.2d 442 (1942) where the New York court overturned the superin-
tendent's refusal to renew a license based on analogous statutory terms.
108. Gem State Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. O'Connell, 79 Idaho 427, 320 P.2d 329
(1958), (reversing an order disapproving clause giving longer grace period than required;
court held statute complied with and commissioner initst approve) ; John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Dressel, 35 Ohio Op. 161, 74 N.E2d 629 (1946) (group life policy held
to conform to statutory requirements after exhaustive analysis; commissioner enjoined
from disapproving); Newcomb v. Victory Life Ins. Co., 159 Kan. 403, 155 P.2d 456
(1945).
109. Continental Ins. Co. v. Charest, 97 N.H. 378, 20 A.2d 477 (1941).
110. E.g., Frenzer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 27 Cal. App. 2d 406, 81
P.2d 197 (1938) ; Glover v. Rowan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 228 N.C. 195, 45 S.E.2d 45 (1947) ;
Merchants Mut. Cas. Co. v. Egan, 91 N.H. 368, 20 A.2d 480 (1941) ; Scanlan v. Home
Ins. Co., 79 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1935); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
168 Wis. 456, 169 N.W. 609 (1918). The statute is "read into" the defective policy.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13468 (1957); N.Y. INS. LAw § 143; iVxs. STAT., § 204.31(3) (i)
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the converse case. Sometimes by statute an approved noncomplying policy
may be enforced against the insurer.11'
Even if the statute is not explicit, one's first inclination is to think
that the same result would be reached and the noncomplying policy held
invalid, at least when the company relies on it. However, the careless
use of the words "may" and "shall" creates interpretive problems. If the
commissioner "may" disapprove a form, the wording suggests power also
to approve. Other provisions, often immediate neighbors to "may" pro-
visions, say that the commissioner "shall" disapprove or "shall not" ap-
prove a form."' Equally interesting is a change made by the NAIC sub-
committee in the model bill for credit life and credit accident and health
insurance from a "may" provision to a "shall" provision." 3  Under tra-
ditional canons of statutory construction, such differences are thought to
exist for some reason, such as to require disapproval in one case and in
the other to give discretion. However, it is doubtful that these results
would be reached predictably. The reasons for which the commissioner
"may" disapprove a form are often of a kind to preclude discretion.
Thus, some provisions say the commissioner "may" disapprove if a policy
contains provisions "contrary to law or to the public policy of this
state" ;... such provisions would surely be ineffective even if approved.
Of course insurance departments do approve some nonconforming
policies by mistake. The errors may be discovered when claims are de-
nied and policyholders complain to the departments or litigation develops
between insurer and policyholder. This may result in reconsideration and
withdrawal of approval.
Sometimes a commissioner knowingly approves illegal policy forms.
When the Wisconsin commissioner recently discovered that many forms
in use did not comply with the law, he worked with a committee of in-
surers' representatives to eliminate the objectionable provisions; pending
(1963). Of course the commissioner's judgment "is entitled to much weight." White v.
National Old Line Ins. Co., 203 Miss. 752, 765, 34 So.2d 234, 236 (1948). It is "some-
what persuasive of its compliance with the statute." Drogula v. Federal Life Ins. Co.,
24S Mich. 645, 648, 227 N.V. 692, 693 (1929). Anderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 193
Miss. 1, 6 So.2d 293 (1942), gave weight to an approval by the Tennessee commissioner
that it would not have given to the action of its own.
111. See, e.g., Wxs. STAT. § 203.08 (1963).
112. "May" provisions are more common. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12236
(1957); Mich. Pub. Acts 1958, No. 173, § 13; N.Y. INS. LAw § 154(1), (4) ; Wis. STAT.
§ 204.31(3) (g) (1963) ; NAIC model bill for credit life and credit accident and health
insurance, § 7B, in 1958 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I 106, 110. For "shall" provisions, see N.Y.
INS. LAw, § 154-(5), (6), (7) ; Wis. ADm. CODE, INS. 6.05(5). N.Y. INS. LAw § 154
provides the most startling contrast, between subsections (1) and (4) on the one hand,
and (5), (6) and (7) on the other.
113. Compare 1958 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I 106, 110, § 7B with 1960 NAIC PROCEED-
INGS II 479, 482, § 7B.
114. N.Y. INS. LAw, § 154(1). See also MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12236(2).
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this revision, he continued to approve noncomplying forms like those
already in use, in order to avoid discrimination among insurers."1 5 Such
cases are unlikely to come before the courts for review, despite serious
doubts about validity.
Sometimes a commissioner is authorized to grant an exemption from
statutory minimum requirements. For instance, the New York superin-
tendent "may approve" a disability insurance certificate which omits or
modifies required provisions "if he deems such omission or modification
suitable for the character of such insurance and not unjust to the persons
insured thereunder.... "' The statute raises the question whether the
superintendent's order disapproving such a form might be reversed by a
court on substantive grounds. The use of "may," coupled with the re-
maining language, strongly suggests that the commissioner has wide dis-
cretion to approve.
In summary, it may be said that the commissioner has only limited
discretion-in-law in the approval of policy forms, and the extent of the
discretion varies from state to state and from provision to provision of
the statutes. Of course, insurer reluctance to incur the commissioner's
wrath by resorting to the courts gives many commissioners a larger de-
gree of discretion-in-fact. There seems to be a marked tendency to give
him wider discretion. The shift from required provisions to be adopted
"in the words prescribed" by statutes to provisions which can be replaced
by language in substance equivalent or more favorable to the insured in-
creases the commissioner's power, for he must decide, at least initially
and usually finally, whether a clause is more favorable to the insured.
The use of general standards without detailed specifications seems more
common, too.
Judicial review of the commissioner's decisions on policy forms may
occur either on direct or collateral attack. The result may vary from one
kind of proceeding to another, for the attitude of a court in ruling on the
validity of a term may depend upon whether an insurance company is op-
posed by the insurance commissioner or by its policyholder.
Direct review is quite generally available to the insurer. For ex-
ample, New York has a general provision subjecting all orders and deci-
sions of the superintendent to judicial review.1 7 Frequently the insur-
ance provision simply adopts the state's general administrative procedure
115. 1959 WIs. CoM'R OF INS. ANN. REPT. 47.
116. N.Y. INS. LAW § 162(4).
117. N.Y. INS. LAW § 34. See also MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 24.1244 (1957); Wis.
STAT. §§ 204.31(9), 227.15-.20 (1963).
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act.' Seldom is direct review sought by anyone other than an insurer;
few complainants would have both standing to sue and an interest in at-
tacking directly a determination of the commissioner favorable to the
insurer. In one case, however, a state district attorney sought man-
damus to compel the insurance commissioner to revoke a company's li-
cense for issuing profit-sharing policies in alleged violation of a non-
discrimination statute. The court agreed that the contract was in viola-
tion of the statute, but declined to issue the writ, saying that the commis-
sioner's duty was discretionary, not ministerial. It is not clear whether
the court would have reviewed his decision in a more appropriate pro-
ceeding."'
The procedure on direct review is usually governed by the general
rules concerning the review of administrative orders, and need not be
discussed here."'
Collateral review occurs most often in a suit by a policyholder against
an insurer where the insurer in its defense relies on a clause the policy-
holder asserts to be contrary to the statute. Whether the commissioner's
approval will be disregarded if provisions of the policy violate the law
depends on the extent of his discretion.'' Conversely, the courts have
sometimes disregarded the lack of approval and have given effect to other-
wise legal but unapproved provisions. 22
f. Enforcement of Orders. Violations of the commissioner's or-
ders seldom come as open challenges to his authority. More often they
are discovered only through complaints of policyholders, in the course of
lawsuits, or through spotchecking forms during general examinations of
insurers. Sometimes hints are given by competitors.
When violations are discovered, the commissioner's order may be
enforced through a variety of administrative or public law devices; pri-
vate law effect may also be given to approval, disapproval, or failure to
118. Thus Wis. STAT. § 204.31(9) (1963) refers to the provisions of Wis. STAT.
227.01-.26 (1937).
119. Cole v. State ex rel. Harris, 91 Miss. 628, 45 So. 11 (1907).
120. lica. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(21.2)-(21.10) (1961); N.Y. CIVIL PRaCicc LAW& RULES §§ 7801-06; Wis. STAT. §§ 227.15-227.20 (1963). Key Western Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839 (1961), deals in much detail with
the scope and procedure of direct review in Texas.
121. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
122. Walters v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Kan. 404, 226 Pac. 746 (1924). In
Blount v. Royal Fraternal Ass'n, 163 N.C. 167, 79 S.E. 299 (1913), a statute made it
unlawful to issue life policies for an amount less than $500 unless the forms were ap-
proved by the commissioner. The court started from a presumption that the contracts
were valid, placed the burden of showing nonapproval on the plaintiff policyholder, found
that the burden had not been satisfied, and gave effect to limiting language in the con-
tract. The court said that if the lack of approval were proven the policy would be un-
lawful and the plaintiff would recover nothing at all "except possibly upon the idea that
the insured would not be in pari delicto with the company."
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approve. Public law enforcement may be carried out by the commis-
sioner, by local prosecuting attorneys, or by the attorney general; ordi-
narily the initiating power lies with the commissioner, who may some-
times take action himself but sometimes must stimulate prosecuting at-
torneys or the attorney general to action. The appropriate action may de-
pend on the type of remedy sought, the line of insurance involved, and
the state.12
3
The most common penalty is the imposition of a fine or "forfeiture."
In some jurisdictions this tends in practice to be a "voluntary" payment
by the delinquent insurer to avoid more severe treatment, although the
statutes usually provide that the forfeiture shall be in addition to any
other punishment. In Wisconsin, a forfeiture up to 500 dollars may be im-
posed upon written consent of the insurer and without a hearing.124  In
a recent New York case, a fine of 13,000 dollars was imposed after a
hearing in which the matter was "settled by stipulation." '
Though violations of the insurance law are often made criminal of-
fenses, punishable by fine and imprisonment,12 actual imposition of crim-
inal sanctions is unusual.
Usually the commissioner has the power to revoke or suspend the in-
surer's license.22 There seem to be no reported court decisions where
such action has been taken to punish the use of unapproved policy forms,
nor have we seen indications of unreported use of this drastic sanction.
In view of the extreme adverse effects of suspension or revocation of li-
cense on the insurer's financial situation and the policyholders' security,
a commissioner would be slow to take that step for such violations alone,
but the power to revoke a license gives him an important weapon for
negotiation.
To compel compliance with an order to discontinue use of a dis-
approved policy form, the commissioner usually has express authority to
obtain an injunction; sometimes the statute explicitly enacts the tradi-
123. See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1228 (1957); Wis. STAT., § 200.14(1)
(1963). Prosecuting attorneys are usually too much concerned with more serious crimes
to pay much attention to technical violations of insurance statutes. See Kimball & Jack-
son, The Regidation of Insutrance Marketing, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 141, 179-180 (1961).
124. Wis. STAT. § 200.14(2) (1963). The sum goes to the school fund.
125. The Journal of Commerce, July 11, 1961. The fine imposed was $13,000, for
the use of credit accident and health and credit life insurance forms which had not pre-
viously been filed with the department. Journal of Commerce, No 28, 1961, p. 8, reports
a similar case with a fine of $5,000. For special statutory provisions see MicH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24.12866, .13480 (1957); N.Y. Is. LAw § 164(8); Wis. STAT. §§ 203.08,
203.22, 204.31(8) (1963).
126. See MicH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1150 (1957) ; N.Y. INs. LAw § 5; Wis. STAT. §
201.58 (1963).
127. See MicEr. STAT. ANN. § 24.12866 (1957) ; N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 40(6), 164(8);
Wis. STAT., §§ 200.14(1) (foreign insurers), 203.08, 203.22, 204.31(8) (1963).
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tional equity limitation that the injunction must be necessary to prevent
irreparable injury."'
Issuance of a conditional license provides a curious device for policy
control; one insurance commissioner qualified a license issued to a
foreign company by forbidding use of a proposed policy. Despite lack of
specific authority to review the form, the court refused the company's
request for mandamus to compel deletion of the condition, on the ground
that the policy would be, in fact, violative of the state's public policy.'
The question whether private law relations-that is, between com-
pany and policyholder or beneficiary-are affected by the requirement of
department approval is more difficult. In one case, a beneficiary sued
on a life insurance policy to which was attached a war clause rider which
had been refused approval by the Director of Insurance, as required by
Illinois statute. The death was not covered under the terms of the rider,
which excluded coverage during military service unless the policyholder
received written consent from a specified official of the company and
paid the extra premiums required by the company. The trial court held
for the beneficiary but the appellate court reversed, refusing to give
private law effect to the refusal of the Director to approve and saying
that a fine or penalty might be used to enforce the order. The Supreme
Court of Illinois reinstated the judgment of the trial court but put the
result on the ground that the rider was indefinite and uncertain and lacked
mutuality and hence was void. The court does not make its position clear
about the effect of disapproval but leaves the matter in doubt. 3 ' When
the company seeks to defend a suit on the policy on the ground that it
was issued without approval, it is easy to refuse private law effect thus
holding the insurer liable,"' but some cases refuse it even if the insurer
gets the benefit of the refusal."' Sometimes the court seems to be deny-
ing private law effect to a valid action of the commissioner and in other
cases seems to be reviewing its validity. The kind of decision being made
is not always clear.
The court was in no doubt when the question was raised in New
Hampshire. It gave private law effect to approval or nonapproval in a
128. N.Y. lIs. LAW, § 35.
129. Knott v. State, ex rel. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 136 Fla. 184, 186 So.
788 (1939).
130. Dempsey v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 338 Ill. App. 109, 86 N.E.2d 871
(1949), rcv'd 404 Ill. 423, 88 N.E.2d 874 (1949).
131. Southern Cas. Co. v. Hughes, 33 Ariz. 206, 263 Pac. 584 (1928).
132. Graf v. Employees Liability Assur. Corp., 190 Iowa 445, 180 N.W. 297 (1920);
Hopkins v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 76, 121 N.E., 465 (1918), followed
by Reddington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1942). See also Union
Assur. Soc. v. Smiller, 29 F.Supp. 127 (1928).
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declaratory judgment proceeding, though without deciding the merits
since it did not appear whether the commissioner had approved. 3 In
Texas also, the court has seemed ready to give full private law effect to
the commissioner's action. In a suit on a fire policy, the company relied
on an exclusion clause inserted in an otherwise standard policy. The
clause apparently had been submitted for approval but the insurance de-
partment had taken no action. The Supreme Court of Texas held the
clause to be void, thus giving private law effect to the approval require-
ment.' Perhaps contributing to this result is the fact that in Texas the
power to prescribe entire forms has been delegated to the department and
the delegation upheld."3 5
An attempt by a policyholder to rescind a policy and recover the pre-
mium paid, on the ground that the policy was void because the form had
not been approved by the commissioner, was unsuccessful in Kansas.'
In another case, on instructions of the Kansas commissioner, a company
that had issued many unapproved policies which were allegedly discrim-
inatory as against other policyholders, cancelled them all. The cancella-
tion was based on a reserved power to cancel on five days notice con-
tained in the policies, so the case did not truly test the validity of the is-
sued policies." 7
g. Withdrawal of Approval. A commissioner may sometimes wish
to withdraw previously granted approval. The insurer has an interest in
assurance that approval once given will not be withdrawn, for commit-
ment to a marketing program may be a substantial investment. On the
other hand, inadequacy of policy examination by insurance departments
and the resulting practice of approving forms perfunctorily or permitting
the deemer period to lapse without review makes the power of subsequent
disapproval indispensable to protect policy holders. Even in the New
York department, an approved life insurance rider later had to be dis-
approved when it was discovered that it contained an unlawful suicide
clause.'
The Indiana court has held there can be no estoppel against the com-
missioner by approval or consent,'39 though the significance of the case is
133. Continental Cas. Co. v. Buxton, 88 N.H. 447, 191 Atl. 1 (1937), followed by
American Employers Ins. Co. v. Worden, 92 N.H. 249, 29 A.2d 417 (1942).
134. Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Preston, 115 Tex. 351, 282 S.W. 563 (1926).
135. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
136. Walters v. Western Auto. Ins. C., 116 Kan. 404, 226 Pac. 746 (1924).
137. Olson v. Western Auto. Ins. Co. 115 Kan. 227, 222 Pac. 104 (1924).
138. See Michaelson & Goodridge, Filing and Approval of Forms in EXA1INATION
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 395.
139. Department of Ins. v. Church Members Relief Ass'n, 217 Ind. 58, 26 N.E.2d
51 (1940).
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limited by the fact that the commissioner's action was regarded as minis-
terial. Other questions arise where he has discretion. In the absence of
express statutory provision, only exceptional cases have suggested that
the commissioner's decision was irreversible.' Today most statutes ex-
pressly authorize him to withdraw approval previously given, if he finds
that a form does not comply with the law. The grounds for withdrawal
are usually the same as those for initial disapproval, including whatever
discretion existed there. Usually a procedure is also prescribed. It may
be more formal than that for initial disapproval and ordinarily involves
at least notice and a hearing."4 Some departments that have no express
statutory authority to withdraw approval do so anyway, relying on a
general duty to enforce the law; others think they have no power to with-
draw approval.
42
Action on forms already in use is often precipitated by a court deci-
sion or an attorney general's opinion,' or a change to a stricter law. Spe-
cial problems are sometimes created by such an enactment. For example,
when a 1961 California statute increased the requirements for approval
of individual hospital, medical, or surgical policies," requiring that bene-
fits not be unreasonable in relation to the premium to be charged, the de-
partment estimated that at least 20,000 currently approved forms would
be affected. Adequate review of those forms would have been virtually
impossible. Consequently the department, after enunciating by general
rule a standard of reasonableness in terms of a minimum loss ratio,
worked out on a trial basis a preliminary screening procedure to enable it
to handle this large volume of work. 4' Similarly, faced with a new 1957
statute providing stricter standards which had potential effect on 32,000
forms then on file, the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners promul-
gated a general rule exempting these forms from the approval require-
ment and then set up a procedure by which the exemption would gradu-
ally be withdrawn in order to effect an orderly review of the forms. Com-
panies were to certify such of their forms as they thought complied with
the law and spot tests by the department would then determine whether
140. Cole v. State ex rel. Harris, 91 Miss. 628, 45 So. 11 (1907), merely decided
that mandamus was not available at the instance of a prosecuting attorney to compel re-
versal. However, the court was obviously influenced by the possible hardships to the
company implicit in reversal.
141. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.12236(2), (3) (1957); N.Y. INs. LAw § 141;
WIs. STAT. § 204.31(3)(g) (1963).
142. 1952 NAIC PRocEDINGs 529.
143. See Michaelson & Goodridge, op. cit. supra note 138.
144. CALIF. INS. CODE § 10293.
145. Calif. Ins. Dep't, Ruling Nol 127, File No. RH-89, Nov. 30, 1962.
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an exhaustive check should be made.14
If the commissioner decides that a kind of form previously approved
by the department should no longer be approved, difficult problems may
exist. Because the statutes so frequently require notice and hearing for
withdrawal of approval, it seems quite likely that in the absence of special
statutory enactment, any attempt to compel withdrawal on a blanket basis
will fail; no withdrawal could then be made without either the acquies-
cence of the insurers concerned or notice and hearing in every disputed
case. The number of forms subject to such a decision may lead the com-
missioner to conclude that it is not worth the effort to tighten his rules
if he must have individual procedures for each one. Moreover, existing
form files may be incomplete or at least chaotic and finding out what
forms have been approved that need action may be a forbidding task.
The commissioner may decide instead merely to stop approving such
forms for the future and rely on the normal processes of attrition to take
care of the existing problem eventually, assisted by such prodding from
the department as proves possible. But disapproval for the future alone
has two undesirable aspects. First it involves a certain element of dis-
crimination among companies, though surely not discrimination that is
objectionable on constitutional grounds. Second, it would discourage
companies issuing policies that are no longer being approved from modi-
fying those forms favorably to the insured in other respects, because such
improved forms would not be approved.
3. The Complaint Function of the Department.
Besides the making of rules and the control of general policy terms
insurance departments also intervene frequently in individual contract
matters. While they have no judicial power and may not definitively
decide contested cases between insurers and policyholders against the will
of either party, they do encourage policyholders to submit complaints and
try, by negotiation with the insurers, to solve the problems raised. justi-
fication for such activity lies partly in the assistance it gives the depart-
ment in performing its central function of approving forms and partly
in the need for a flexible and summary machinery to give assistance to
policyholders on matters that do not justify the expense of more formal
legal proceedings.
The New York department maintains complaint bureaus in New
York City and Albany with substantial staffs. In 1961 these bureaus
handled 9,295 complaints concerning loss settlement or policy provisions.
Most concerned automobile liability insurance and accident and health
146. State Bd. of Ins. v. Sam Houston Life Ins. Co., 344 S.W.2d 709 (Tev. 1961),
describes the procedure and quotes most of the relevant statutes and regulations.
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insurance." 7 Other state departments have comparable activity.
The general policy seems to be to press the companies to make pay-
ment in cases where the strict application of the provisions of the policy,
although technically justified, would cause undue hardship and to induce
insurers to exercise a more liberal attitude in loss settlement practice." 8
The procedure followed in these cases is rather informal, and the meas-
ures taken are in most instances limited to recommendations without bind-
ing force. However, the commissioner's wish is not lightly disregarded
even when it is considered to be unjustified. There is some danger, in
fact, that departments may induce companies to pay when a sound social
policy would dictate otherwise.
Further exploration of the complaint function as it is related to
policy form approval seems unwarranted, since its main focus is on loss
settlement. An extensive investigation into the complaint files of one
department has progressed a long way; when it is reported it will supple-
ment this study at this point.
III. ADMiINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER POLICY TERMS IN EUROPE
A. Organization of Insuraiwe Departments
1. Germany. In 1901 the German Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz
(VAG), or insurance supervision law, created the Kaiserliches (later
Reichs) Aufsichtsamt ffir Privatversicherung."'9 Vith the collapse of
Germany in 1945 the Reiclhsaufsichtsamt came to an end. The occupa-
tion forces established supervisory agencies, the one for the British oc-
cupation zone being in Hamburg. After formation of the West German
Federal Republic in 1949, a new Bundesaufsichtsamt, or Federal Insur-
ance Department, established in 1951,"80 took over most of the personnel
of the British Zone agency, many of whom were former staff members
of the old Reichs'aufsichtsamt. This preserved some continuity in regu-
latory practice. The main substantive rules of supervision have remained
unchanged since 1901.'
147. N.Y. 103RD Pp.ux=. REnPr. 108.
148. See Van Schaick, in 1932 NCIC PRoCEEDINGS 151; Mortensen, in 1932 NCIC
PROCEEDINGS 157.
149. REICHSGESET7 OBER DiE PRIVATEN VERSIC arRUNGSUNTERNEHimUNGEN VOM 12.
MAI 1901 (hereafter abbreviated VAG), [1901] Reichsgesetzblatt 139. German sattu-
tory materials for insurance regulation are conveniently available in EUROPAIScHES
VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSRECHT, (Schmidt ed. 1964).
150. Gesetz fiber die Errichtung eines Bundesaufsichtsamtes ffir das Versicherungs-
und Bausparwesen yom 31. Juli 1951 (hereafter abbreviated BAG), [1951] Bundes-
gesetzblatt I 480, also reproduced in PRLSS, VERSICEERUNGSAU'SICETSGESETZ 18-92 (4
Aufl. 1963) (hereafter abbreviated Pr61ss, VAG).
151. An important exception was enactment of § 81a by Gesetz zur Anderung des
Gesetzes fiber die Beaufsichtigung der privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen und
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Enforcement of the VAG and other statutes relating to insurance
supervision is divided between the Federal Insurance Department (here-
after called the department) and individual state agencies, which have
control mainly of local insurers of minor economic importance." 2  Co-
operation between the state agencies and the department is achieved by
regular meetings to discuss regulatory policy, including such things as
new policy forms.158 This cooperation parallels on a smaller scale that of
the NAIC in the United States. Problems are fewer because there is a
single common statute, because the German states are fewer in number,
and because only the federal department deals with the large commercial
companies.
Though the department has a large measure of independence, it is
formally subordinate to the Minister of Economics."' The subordina-
tion is meaningful at certain points, but not on the subject matter of this
article. The president of the department is appointed for life by the
Bundespriidsident upon recommendation of the Minister of Economics.
Average tenure has been about six years. About thirty senior officials of
the department have been appointed for life by the Bundesprisident; the
others are appointed by the Minister of Economics. Altogether there are
about 100 discretion-exercising officials, graded in the upper levels of the
civil service. Most are lawyers; the others are actuaries, economists, and
accountants. In total the department employs about 250 persons. Its
1963 budget was about $1,131,300.' In comparing these figures with
those for the American insurance departments (New York: 680 em-
Bausparkassen vom 5. Mfrz 1937, § 4a, [1937] Reichsgesetzblatt I 269. It authorized
the insurance department to demand alteration of the Geschtiftsplan, or plan for doing
business. Under certain circumstances § 81a empowers the department to affect existing
contracts by its order.
152. BAG § 2 defines the boundary line. PR6LSS, VAG 37-38 provides a list of the
state agencies. State agencies may have their own procedures and organization but must
apply federal substantive law. BAG §§ 3, 4, 5 provide for transfer of regulatory power
from the state to the federal agency or vice versa.
153. In 1959-60, three meetings dealt with topics ranging from tax problems of
small mutual insurers, through new AVB for the insurance of frozen foods, to the im-
pact of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Bundesaufsichtsamt
ffir das Versicherungs- vund Bausparwesen, Geschiftsbericht 1959-60, at 1-2 (hereafter
referred to as Geschiiftsbericht).
154. In 1901, the agency was made subject to the Ministry of the Interior. That
was changed in 1917, on the creation of the Ministry of Economics. [1917] Reichsgesetz-
blatt 963. See also Materialien zum Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, Entwurf des Gesetzes
(Begriindung) at 91 (1900). VAG § 106 gives the minister discretion on the licensing
of foreign companies, now qualified by the "freedom of establishment" provisions of the
Treaty of Rome, Arts. 52-58. Text of the treaty, with commentary, may be found in
WOHLFARTH-EVERLING-GLAESNER-SPRUNG, DiE EURoPAiscHE WiRTscHArTSGEMEINSCHAFT
(1960).
155. 1963 Gesdhiftsbericht 12. The industry now bears directly 9/10 of the cost,
apportioned on the basis of premium receipts. VAG § 101.
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ployees, $6,000,000) it must be kept in mind that in Germany examina-
tion of companies is done by independent private accounting firms em-
ployed by the companies, while American departments tend to have their
own examiners. Further, the German Department engages very little in
rate regulation and does not license or otherwise regulate agents.'
The department is organized in eight divisions, including divisions
for life, for sickness, for property, and for liability and accident insur-
ance. Each of these operating divisions is responsible for all regulatory
questions in its assigned branches of insurance, including the approval of
forms; there is no general policy examination bureau.
The VAG provides for a Beirat, an advisory committee of insurance
experts of various kinds, "for participation in regulation." Its sixty mem-
bers are appointed for five-year terms by the Bundesprdsident upon rec-
ommendation of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council. 57 The Beirat has
both advisory and decision-making functions, including some activity in
relation to approval of policy forms.
The implementing regulation for the establishment of the Federal
Insurance Department created Beschlusskanwern, ad hoc committees, to
decide individual cases, consisting of three officials of the department and
two members of the Beirat."8 They decide by majority vote after a hear-
ing. In cases involving small mutual insurers and in cases where an ap-
plication is to be approved, the president of the department may decide
alone, by written order. Proceedings before a Besclwsskammer about
contract terms are infrequent, since differences of opinion are nearly al-
ways settled by negotiation, and the final order is usually a confirmation
of an agreement already reached. In such cases the decision may be
made by the president alone. When an application for approval of policy
terms is not to be granted in full, however, a Bescllusskanwer will be
called. Its decisions in turn may be reviewed by the Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht,"' a federal administrative court. Since 1952, there have been
from seven to sixteen proceedings a year before a Beschlusskammer, but
few have concerned policy terms.
The department has under its supervision about a thousand insurers,
but the number is almost irrelevant to the amount of regulatory work
performed in the control of contract terms. There are no statistics about
156. For a survey of higher level department personnel, see 1963 Geschaftsbericht
11-12; for appointment provisions, see VAG § 90.
157. VAG § 92; Dritte Durchfiihrungsverordnung zum Gesetz fiber die
Errichtung eines Bundesaufsichtsamtes ffir das Versicherungs- und Bausparwesen, vom
25 MArz 1953, E 3, [1953] Bundesgesetzblatt 1:75. This Verordnung is hereafter cited as
3. DVO. It is reprinted with commentary in PR6LSS, VAG, at 55-86.
158. 3. DVO §§ 7, 10; see PR6LSS, VAG at 63, 77.
159. BAG § 10a.
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the number of policy forms handled, since regulation takes a different
form. The Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen (AVB), general pol-
icy terms, are generally developed, amended, or revised by joint action of
the department and large industry groups. Approval of forms for use by
single insurers is usually a matter of routine. But in Germany the de-
velopment of AVB is a more important regulatory activity relative to
other regulatory tasks than is the approval of policy forms in the United
States.
2. France. Despite its relatively advanced economy, France was
late in developing a comprehensive system of insurance regulation. But
the Direction des Assurances, (hereafter called the department) is now
established as a special agency within the Ministry of Finance."' There
are no agencies on a local level. The department is considered a technical
and not a political agency, though political influence on administrative
decision is not unknown.
The present staff consists of about 200 persons, including about
thirty highly ranked civil servants with thorough administrative training
and about 120 lower ranked civil servants with special actuarial and legal
knowledge, with about thirty traveling examiners among them. Ex-
penses, including those of the Conseil National des Assurances, are borne
by the insurance industry in proportion to premium income.' Until 1964
a special section of the "general affairs" division of the department
handled all policy forms and other documents except life insurance forms,
which because of their actuarial implications were processed in the special
life insurance section.162  On February 1, 1964, a new organization plan
was introduced by order of the Directeur des Assurances. According to
the new pattern, the department is organized in three divisions: the
French insurance market, the technical and financial control of insurance
enterprises, and general affairs (organization, personnel, statistics, spe-
cial services). Policy control is no longer counted among general affairs
but among the legal and economic questions handled separately in the
three sections of the first division-life insurance, marine and reinsur-
ance, and other lines. Thus no one is occupied exclusively with policy
examination, and no statistics are available about the work actually done.
However, department officials think the staff is not large enough. Lack
160. Loi du 23 fivrier 1941. Statements about France not otherwise supported by
citations are -based upon interviews in the department in April 1962 and July 1964 and
on internal instructions in use there. The French investigations were made by Mr.
Pfennigstorf. French sources for insurance regulatory law are conveniently available
in Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 149.
161. Ordonnance du 29 septembre 1945, art. 11, and Loi du 25 avril 1946, art. 14.
162. D6cret du 30 d6cembre 1938, art. 181. The new organization plan is published
in 1964 ANNU AiR DEs SOCI]TLES D'ASSURANCES.
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of personnel has made it impossible in the past to review adequately all
the documents that are subject to the filing requirement. Activity was
limited to policy and application forms, with other material being re-
viewed only exceptionally.
At the end of 1962, the department supervised 582 insurance enter-
prises, of which 375 were French and 207 were foreign.' In order to
evaluate the work load, it must be known that all kinds of documents are
subject to filing and review and that each new edition of a document
must be submitted. Moreover, standard forms are used less frequently
than in Germany; thus many forms must be examined individually for
every insurer. The situation is more nearly comparable to that in the
United States. In 1950, about 250 policy forms (other than life insur-
ance) were reviewed; in 1961, the number was 800 to 1000.
The law provides for a Conseil National des Assurances, an advisory
committee analogous to the German Beirat, which was established in 1946
to replace the Conseil Superieur des Assurances created by the law of
1938. The Minister of Finance is the president of the Conseil."4 At first
the insurance industry was not represented at all in the Conseil; since
1954 it has had seven representatives among the thirty-eight members.
The others include representatives of insurers' employees, agents and
brokers, policy-holders, and government.
The Conseil National has little importance for the control of policy
terms. The Minister must ask its advice in certain cases but need not
follow it, even on refusal or withdrawal of a license, though in this case
there must be two consultations.' 6 ' Where the advice of the Conseil
National is prescribed by law, the decision usually results from unofficial
talks between department officials and the most interested and influential
members of the Conseil. Even when the advice is not required by law, it
is sometimes asked in order to maximize the pressure upon the insurance
industry.
163. Rapport sur la Situation en 1962 des Soci~t~s d'Assurances . . 7 (1964).
These figures include marine insurers but not reinsurers.
164. Loi du 25 avril 1946, art. 14-23 as amended by dcret du 28 Mai 1954. In 1940
under German influence, the Comit6 d'Organisation des Assurances was established, with
broad powers to exercise a kind of self-regulation of the insurance business. Loi du
16 aofit 1940. It was abolished at the end of the war, but its powers devolved upon the
Minister of Finance. Ordonnance du 29 septembre 1945, art. 1-9. See also OECD,
Supervision of Private Insurance in France 47 (1963), hereafter cited as OECD State-
ment (France). This statement was prepared for the OECD by the Direction des
Assurances. The ideas governing the Comit6 d'Organisation seem to have influenced
the functions assigned the Conseil National des Assurances 'by the 1946 law. Pro-
cedural rules for the Conseil National have been promulgated by the Minister. Arr~t6
du 28 juin 1954.
165. D~ret-Loi du 14 juin 1938, art. 8.
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The law also provides that the'Conseil National shall submit sugges-
tions to the Minister concerning premium rates and general policy
terms. 6' It was hoped that control would work as a stimulus to rational-
ize and reorganize the insurance business.' A particular need for such
activity was felt since the compulsory provisions of the law of 1930 leave
little room for experimentation."s The contribution of the Conseil
National in this direction has not been highly regarded. Its suggestions
have not always been practicable, and recently it has not produced any.
B. The Activity of Administrative Agencies
1. Germany.
a. Rule-making activity. The German insurance department has
power to make general rules respecting insurance contracts in only two
cases. 16  First, it may make rules prohibiting the granting of special
benefits to single policyholders or groups of policyholders.' The depart-
ment has implemented this policy against discrimination by issuing gen-
eral rules defining and limiting the special benefits permitted in group
insurance contracts and prohibiting such abuses in marketing practices as
rebating by agents.' 7'
The second power for making general rules was created in 1940 by
a Verordnung, or legislative order, authorizing the insurance department
to make any existing AVB compulsory for all insurers and even applic-
able to existing contracts. -' Though the authorization was given mainly
to adjust existing motor vehicle liability insurance contracts to the new
compulsory insurance law, it was completely general in its terms. Sub-
166. Loi du 25 avril 1946, art. 15.
167. See the report and opinions in 1946 REVUE Gf.NtRALE DES AssURANCEs TER-
RESTRES 187, 202; see also the opinion of the Minister of Finance quoted by Picard,
La 'Nalionalisatimz. de Certahes Socitjs d'Assurances (loi du 25 avril 1946) in 1946
REVUE GNtRALE DES ASSURANCES TEREsTREs 109, 112. On the other hand, when the
biggest companies were nationalized, a "free sector" of smaller companies was retained
for the purpose of giving free room for experiments with new forms of coverage. See
the report in 1946 REVUE GPNPRALE DES ASSuRANcEs TERRESTRES 189.
168. See PICARD ET BESsoN, LES ASSURANCES TEmmsTREs EN DROIT FRANCAIs 62
(1950). See Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 719-720.
169. For the rule-making powers of the insurance department in general see Weber,
Die Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse des Reichs-und Bundesaufsichtsamts in der Versicher-
ungsaufsicht, in I FijNFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEM
GESETZ VOm 12. MAI 1901 49-72 (Rohrbeck ed. 1952).
170. VAG § 81(2), Satz 3. The regulations must be promulgated in the
Bundesanzeiger.
171. Starke, Die Anordnungen der Versicherimgsaufschtsbeh~rde nach den §§ 81,
81a, 89 VAG, in 1 FiNFzIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEX
GEsETz vom 12. MAI 1901 73, 87-92 (Rohrbeck ed. 1952).
172. Verordnung fiber die Anwendung Allgemeiner Versicherungsbedingungen
vom 29. November 1940, [1940] Reichsgesetzblatt I 1543, reproduced and commented on
by Weber, op. cit. supra note 169, at 56-72.
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sequently it was used to make quick changes necessary during the emerg-
ency situation at the end of World War II. The new Federal Insurance
Department has not exercised power under it.
Direct judicial review of such general regulations is possible only
where it is alleged that the regulation violates the Grundgesetz, or federal
constitution. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, or federal constitutional
court, will consider constitutionality upon application of the federal gov-
ernment, a state government, or one-third of the members of the
Bundestag' or federal legislature. Upon collateral attack, as in a law-
suit between an insurer and a policy holder, any court will disregard a reg-
ulation that exceeds the limits of the department's statutory authorization.
Very few constitutional quesions have arisen in Germany respecting
enactments by the national legislature. But somewhat more difficulty
has arisen respecting action taken by administrative agencies to imple-
ment the statutes. For example, there has been considerable discussion
whether certain administrative regulations implementing the statutes,
which were introduced under the Third Reich, still have validity. The
conclusion has been that regulations are not necessarily invalid simply
because they come from the Nazi period, if they are not objectionable on
other grounds. 1 7
The problem of improper delegation can arise under the German
constitution, too. Legislative power may be delegated to the government
or to a single minister, provided that the purpose, the subject matter, and
the scope of the delegation are fixed in the statute.Y15  Under the present
constitution, a subordinate authority like the Federal Insurance Depart-
ment may not be given legislative power, though before the formation of
the Federal Republic there was no such limitation.
b. Rule-enforcing Activity-Approval of Allgemeinw Versicher-
ungsbediugungen (AVB).
In German practice, the policy, or Versicherungsschein, is merely
a certificate of insurance, containing a minimum of information. The
detailed terms of the contract, or AVB, are separately printed.
The application of an insurance company to the German Federal In-
surance Department for a license to do business must be accompanied by
173. Grundgesetz ffir die Bundresrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949, [1949]
Bundesgesetzblatt 1, Art. 93(1), item 2; Gesetz fiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht vom
12. Murz 1951, [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt 243, §§ 13, item 6, and 76.
174. Weber, op. cit. supra note 169, at 56; Starke, op. cit. suplra note 171, at 100-
101; Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 2, 1951, 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesgericht-
shofes in Zivilsachen 55.
175. Grundgesetz, Art. 80(1). A rule issued under this authority is called a
"Verordnung." A Verordnung has prescribed the details of organization and procedure
of the federal insurance department. BAG § 10, and 3 DVO.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a Geschiiftsplan, or plan of operation, which explains the legal, economic,
and financial bases for the proposed activity.17 Among other things,
the GescMftspla contains the AVB, or general terms of the insurance
contract. Amendments of the Geschiiftsplan and therefore of the AVB
must be approved by the department on the same principles as the original
approval. 7 Consequently, new or revised AVB must be submitted to the
department and approved in order to introduce new coverage or modify
old.
The statute formerly required the insurer to furnish the policy-
holder a copy of the AVB, either with the application or the Police. This
requirement has been partly suspended in times of paper shortage, 78 and
at the present time is not compulsory in various lines, including automo-
bile, water leakage, fire, and burglary insurance.17 In all cases the policy
holder must be given a copy on request, but the applicability of the AVB
does not depend on compliance."
Delivery of the AVB is a formal requirement, in the sense that it
seeks to provide the policyholder full information about his coverage.
Most formal requirements in American practice are imposed by statute,
but in Germany they are imposed by the department in the exercise of
its general authority. 8'
i. Scope of the Approval Requirement. AVB constitute a specific
case of a common phenomenon in Germany, the Allgemeine Geschafts-
bedingungen, which are institutionalized contract terms used for mass
contracts of all sorts. 8 Of course no approval is needed for the AVB
of unsupervised lines: ocean marine, transportation insurance, or re-
insurance.'83 Such AVB do exist; for example, the Allgeineine Deutschen
Seeversicherungsbedingungen of 1919 are operative in ocean marine. 84
176. VAG § 5(2), commented on by PRLSS, VAG.
177. VAG § 13. Grounds for refusal of a license are stated in VAG § 8. They
include failure to protect the interests of the insured or ensure that the company's obli-
gations can be met continuously.
178. PR6LSS, VAG § 10, note 5.
179. Ibid.
180. Kimball and Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of
Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice, 39 IND.
L.J. 675, 717 (1964).
181. Ibid.
182. E.g., there are Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteurbedingungen (for forwarding
agencies), Allgemeine Geschiftsbedingungen der Spar-, Girokassen und Kommunal-
banken (for different varieties of savings institutions), and many others.
183. PR6LSS VAG § 5, note 10.
184. The Allgemeine Deutsche Sedversicherungsbedngunge were prepared by in-
surers and policyholders jointly. They are treated in voluminous commentaries. See,
e.g., RITTER, DAs REcH? DER SEEVERSICHERUNG (1922 and 1924) (2 volumes). Even the
proceedings of the drafting commission were published as an aid to interpretation:
BRUcK," MATERIALIEN ZU DEN ALLGEAIEINEN DEUTSCHEN SEEVERSICHERUNGSBEDINGUNGEN
(1919) (2 volumes).
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The approval requirement applies only to standardized contract
forms. Individual agreements can theoretically be made without depart-
ment approval, just as individual riders and endorsements are sometimes
exempted by American statutes. However, VAG section 10(3) permits
deviation from approved AVB to the prejudice of the insured only where
peculiar circumstances warrant, and then only if the policyholder is ex-
pressly informed and consents in writing. If the individual contract de-
viates to the beefit of the insured, the relevant company association or
individual company may complain, and the department may feel that the
favorable treatment contravenes the general policy prohibiting Begunstig-
umgsvertrage, or contracts discriminating in favor of particular policy-
holders."' It would seem to follow that permissible individual contracts
must be genuinely individual and independently negotiated on the basis
of special characteristics of the risk and not be merely deviations un-
supported by justifiable grounds. If the individual agreement is fre-
quently repeated its use is considered an amendment to the Geschdftsplca
and needs approval. How many instances suffice to produce this result
cannot be stated simply-it depends on all the circumstances.' 8  The
possibility of experimenting with new coverage through individual con-
tracts seems so limited as to subject the German system to the reproach
of making the introduction of new developments cumbersome and diffi-
cult. The possibility of individual contracts is frequently referred to in
conversation as a safety valve of the system, but that may be a defense
mechanism, only proving that the conservatism of the German system is
felt to be a problem. It should be understood, however, that this alone
is not sufficient to condemn the system. Further considerations must
be weighed. Nor is it easy to compare the difficulty of introducing new
forms in different systems-in addition to the factors characteristic of
the system, it depends also on the peculiar circumstances of the particular
case.
Application forms, insurance certificates, and like documents are not
generally part of the Geschdiftsplan but are still subject to some control by
the department under its general powers.
185. VAG § 81(2) authorizes department rulings prohibiting such discrimination.
In one recent case, the Verband der Sachversicherer called the attention of the depart-
ment to the fact that a certain company had concluded business interruption insurance
with coverage for a period of interruption shorter than that provided in the AVB, with
the premium reduced even more substantially. The department demanded that the com-
pany agree to discontinue the practice, calling the contract an impermissible Begfin-
stigungsvertrag. The company accepted the ukase without conceding that its position
was wrong.
186. But see 1908 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN iDs KAISEELIcHEN AUFSICnaTSATES 111-
114 for an attempted definition. (This publication is hereafter cited as VER6FFENT-
LICHUNGEN).
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ii. Sanctioning of the Approval Requirement. The approval re-
quirement and restrictions on deviations are merely public law duties of
insurers. The private law validity of nonstandard contracts is not af-
fected by failure to conform to the demands of the statute.187 Adherence
can be compelled only by administrative means.'88 This statement does
not apply, of course, to compulsory terms of the insurance contract law,
which are applicable to govern the relationship whether inserted in the
contract or not. Nor does it apply to the unusual cases where adminis-
trative action is effective to alter the terms of existing insurance con-
tracts."9
iii. Terminology of AVB. It is difficult to carry generalization
very far, for there are significant differences in insurance department
procedure and attitudes among the main branches of insurance. Even
terminology is not standard. To some extent the branches of the busi-
ness have inherent differences; to some extent variations result from
differences in the organization of the business, such as the degree to
which a trade association dominates a branch of insurance; to some ex-
tent they reflect differences within the department itself, the divisions
of which each handle a major branch of insurance essentially independ-
ently. Only at the top level do department officials handle more than
life or property or liability or sickness insurance. At the levels where
agreement is actually worked out on AVB there is opportunity for im-
portant differences to develop over a period of time.
Under the law, applications for approval of new or amended AVB
are made by single insurers. However, in property and liability insur-
ance, the process is so far dominated by the associations that in property
insurance a notification of approval of AVB includes a list of the af-
fected companies, or in liability insurance a statement to the association
that the department is prepared to approve certain AVB is then followed
by formal requests from individual companies, the association acting as
representative, with merely pro forma approval of the AVB by the depart-
ment. In sickness insurance, on the other hand, the process is less domin-
ated by the association, and only the most general terms (called
Grundbedingunge) are worked out through cooperative department-
association action. These are not even "approved" in the formal sense.
Negotiations are then entered into between the department and individual
187. For a discussion of this distinction, see Kimball and Pfennigstorf, stepra
note 180, at 678 pas.sim.
188. In the case discussed in note 185 mtpra. the department made no suggestion that
existing contracts would be affected. Instead, it extracted a commitment from the com-
pany not to engage in like conduct in the future.
189. See note 172 supra.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
insurance companies for the approval of AVB which include, incorpor-
ated by reference, the terms of the appropriate Grundbedingunge. This
situation is affected by the fact that in sickness insurance the statute
makes the tariff a part of the Geschiiftsplan, to be approved as an integral
part of the AVB. Life insurance falls somewhere between sickness and
property insurance, probably closer to the latter, so far as association
domination of the process is concerned.'
In the statutory sense, all policy terms subject to approval are
AVB."1' But some are referred to by other names-the choice of name
is not decisive. Thus, in liability insurance the term Besondere Beding-
ungeit, or "special terms," is used for stipulations applicable to specialized
risks, such as the special terms for the coverage of damage on the occa-
sion of blasting and demolition operations. In property insurance the
term Sonderbedinjungen is used for supplementary types of coverage,
such as replacement cost coverage for dwellings. In property insurance,
the term Klauseln is used for more specialized clauses. A whole schedule
of Klauseb has been approved and is available for use in special situa-
tions. In both branches the term Zvsatzbedingungen, or "supplementary
terms," is used as a near-synonym for Besondere Bedingungen.
Occasionally a broker is responsible for the development of so-called
Maklerbedingungen, and association prepared terms are sometimes called
Normativ- or Verbands- or Musterbedingungem, or "Association
Forms.11 2 But all of these are AVB in the legal sense and are to be dis-
tinguished from terms not subject to approval because only to be used for
particular cases.
The term Besondere Bedingungen is often used, in contrast to its use
described in the paragraphs above, to describe special terms developed for
use in individual contracts, and therefore not subject to approval.
Sometimes the department also approves Geschiftsplanmssige
Erklirungen, "explanations of the plan of operation," as a supplement to
various AVB. Erklirungen may also be used in a less formal way, as a
device for obtaining stipulations from an insurer that it will interpret its
190. VAG §§ 11, 12. On the greater diversity in life insurance as compared to
property insurance, see Arnold, F~rderung der Vergleichbarkeit von Versicherungsleistui-
gen in der Lebensversicherung, in 1957 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 16-18, and Bischoff,
Markttransparena der ATVB in der Sachversicherung als Aufsichtsproblem des § 8(1)
Ziff. I it Verbindung mit § 13 VAG, in 1956 VER&6-FENTLICHUNGEN 33.
191. PRULSS, VAG § 10, note 1.
192. In livestock insurance, the department itself prepared such forms. FINKE,
XVERBUNG UND WErrBmVERn IN DER VERSICHERUNG (a looseleaf service) provides a cur-
rent collection of the main AVB of all lines. PabLss, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (14
Aufl. 1963), also comments on the most important AVB. In addition, the department
has prepared standard forms of bylaws for small mutuals. 1955 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN
157.
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contracts in a certain way. Erk1drungen are likely to begin "We obligate
ourselves to. . . ." followed by a statement of a special case in which the
company will pay.'93  Erklirunge are to be distinguished from all
Bedingungen since they are never intended to be a part of the contract.
They are purely public law matters and are not enforced by the ordi-
nary courts, as Bedingungen are when they are actually used and thus be-
come a part of the contract. The Erklirungen received more detailed ex-
planation later in this paper.
iv. The Process of Approval of AVB. All German insurers be-
long to associations organized according to the insurance business' main
traditional divisions, which take the lead in preparing AVB. This has
many advantages. There has been such an enormous investment of ef-
fort and skill in the preparation of the German AVB as to lead to doubts
in some quarters about the merits of the entire process. It would be a
waste of social resources to duplicate that activity unnecessarily. A de-
scription of the process through examples should prove illuminating."9
The initiative in the development of new or revised AVB generally
rests with the associations or with individual insurers, though occasionally
it rests in the department. When insurers are thought to be using special
contracts repeatedly a demand that they justify their action may lead to
a new form.
The first example deals with the revision of the AVB for business
interruption coverage. In July 1947, an insurance buyer, through his
broker, brought to the department's attention a deficiency in a clause of
the AVB for business interruption insurance. In August the department
requested an opinion from the company on the risk, and the company re-
ferred the matter to a committee of the trade association. In November
the latter suggested modifying the questioned clause to the benefit of the
policyholder. In January 1948, the broker objected to patchwork changes
and suggested a more basic revision. In February, the department asked
the trade association's committee for its opinion and expressed a desire
to look at premium computation methods. 9 ' In March, the trade associa-
tion's committee said it was willing to re-examine the whole clause at its
193. See, e.g., 1959 VERbFFENTLICHUNGEN 130 for some Erklarungen in fidelity
insurance.
194. These descriptions are based upon examination of the complete files in the
offices of the Insurance Department in Berlin. The studies of files in Berlin were made
by Mr. Kimball. The final results were published, as is customary, in 1955
VER6FFENTICHUNGEN 154-56 and 1962 Ver6ffentlichungen 170-75. Comments on these
proceedings may also be found in 1955 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 153, 176-79, and 1962
VFR6FFENTLICHUNGEN 192-98. See also 1921 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 117 for earlier re-
vision of the general liability AVB; 1926 VERFFENTLICHMNGMEN 146 and 1929
VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 131-41 for a major revision of fire insurance AVB.
195. Technically, premium rates in this branch are not subject to regulation.
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next meeting. Simultaneously the Deutscher Versicherungs-Schutz Ver-
band, a protective association of insurance buyers, interpreted the clause
and requested to be heard and to deal with the companies. 9 During the
remainder of 1948 there was much discussion and at least one formal
trade association meeting on the question, as well as some careful thought
in the department. During 1949, the project was enlarged from the re-
vision of the one clause to a wholesale review of the business interrup-
tion AVB. During 1950 and the first half of 1951 activity consisted
mainly of work on a draft by committees of the association. A printed
draft in June 1951 was followed in July by face-to-face discussions be-
tween department and trade association officials. Further communica-
tions and opinions led to a new draft in August. More communications
during 1952 resulted in a new draft in December 1952. During 1953
there were a number of conferences, formal and important enough to pro-
duce minutes and comments many pages in length. Some conferences
were with interested noninsurance associations. A new draft appeared
in December 1953. Up to this point, there had been no formal submis-
sion to the insurance department. In April 1954, a draft was submitted
with a formal request for approval.'97 Thereupon the process moved into
a new phase. From this point a high level official of the department was
clearly pushing the matter along. First the draft was submitted to two
academic experts for opinions as members of the Beirat.95 One of the
experts was not immediately available. When his opinion finally came in
October, his suggestions led the department to call another meeting in
December. This resulted in still another draft, followed by another re-
quest to everyone concerned for opinions. After receipt of these opinions,
the department official wrote one of his own and again called for re-
actions. This exchange led to another meeting in March 1955, focussed
mainly on one clause. After this meeting, the president of the depart-
ment gave notice that he was ready to approve the revised AVB. There-
after requests from individual companies for approval of AVB corre-
sponding to the Alusterbedingungen proceeded routinely and quickly.'99
196. Policyholders or protective associations are often involved at an early stage.
See also 1958 VER6FFENTLICHuNGEN 134 (insurance for electrical power plants).
197. These illustrations show the utility to the proposer of delay of his final
commitment to a position until he has tested the department views. See Arnold, in 1955
VER6FFENTLCHaUNGEN 79-80.
198. Normally Beirat members are consulted, but that may be omitted in simple
cases, especially where the public is already well represented. See e.g., 1952 VER6F-
FENTLICH UNGEN 56-57 (extension of fire coverage to damage caused by fluid glass in a
factory).
199. For an even more expeditious method of approval see 1938 VER6FFENTLICHUN-
GEN 117-18; 1939 VER&FFENTLICH NGEN 122, where the department did not inform the
insurers but left that to the trade association.
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Thus, approval was given nearly eight years after the discussions
were first begun, though it must be noted that it was not eight years after
the question was enlarged to reconsideration of the whole AVB.
The quantity of handwritten notes on letters and between the formal
communications in the file, as well as the numerous changes made in draft
communications, shows that department officials gave much thought to
the matter. It is safe to assume that those concerned on the other sides
of the question were equally diligent.
Another long and intricate proceeding took place in the approval of
AVB for dwelling replacement cost coverage against fire, tapwater, and
storm damage. Beginning about 1951, there was some stirring of in-
terest in connection with these AVB; and in March 1953 the Verband der
Sachversicherer, or Association of Property Insurers, proposed a substan-
tial revision. In May there was a long commentary by a department of-
ficial. The Verband then reconsidered the matter, and after first propos-
ing delay, in July repeated its request for approval. Another opinion
from the department in August led in February 1954 to a new draft, in
which some of the department's suggestions were accepted and some re-
jected. The department raised more questions in March and also sub-
mitted the draft to six noninsurance trade associations presumably in-
terested as insurance buyers.. and to members of the Beirat. Some asso-
ciations disclaimed interest; others wrote lengthy opinions. In July 1954,
the department wrote its comments, based on the various opinions it had
received. Then the matter lay at rest for a year. In July 1955 the Ver-
band sent a new draft with comments. This then lay at rest for three
years, postponed because of a more urgent problem with related AVB. In
December 1958 still another new draft appeared with a long commentary.
This was sent, together with a request for opinion, to five associations
and three Beirat members. Again there were responses, some of them
quite long. For example, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Inzdustrie
sent a seven page, single spaced, typed opinion. A meeting of all interested
persons was held in May 1960, and a new draft was forthcoming in Sep-
tember. There followed the familiar routine of letters to the associations
and members of the Beirat, with responsive opinions. But this repeated
routine was not merely circular, for another meeting in April 1961 was
able to focus on narrower points of disagreement. This led to a new
draft in June, followed by suggestions for the department for both edi-
200. It is customary to consult all groups or persons who may have an interest
The expressed interest is surprisingly wide-ranging. As an extreme example, on one
occasion the Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein, an institution for the preservation
of the German language, expressed an interest in the terminology used. 1932
VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN 121.
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torial and substantive changes. Requests were again made for opinions,
this time to some new people. One of the responses was a single spaced
letter of twelve pages; another contained nine. An August draft was
prepared, and a meeting was held in December, 1961. Thirty pages of
notes in the department file compare the numerous suggestions, while
thirteen pages of notes give the result of the December meeting. There
was an exchange on a point of disagreement between the insurance asso-
ciation and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie. The department
sided with the former and the latter capitulated. In April 1962 a new
draft produced only editorial suggestions in the department, and in Aug-
ust 1962 a final draft was formally approved.
It should not be supposed that these files represent a decade of un-
interrupted activity. There were many periods when nothing was hap-
pening on either side, and seldom was activity going on in both camps at
the same time. Both the officials of the department and the men in the
trade associations had other important activities to pursue simultaneously.
Nor should it be supposed that all work in connection with AVB
moves with the glacial speed manifested in these two. In 1949-1950
Grundbedingungen for sickness insurance took only fifteen months to
produce, though the process was basically like that described above. And
the partial revisions or preparation of Klauseln. or other less comprehen-
sive tasks may sometimes be done very expeditiously. It all depends on
the complexity and urgency of the task and the number of persons or
associations interested in the result. The process may last from a few
days to ten or twelve years.2 '
v. Basic Principles of the Approval Process. Though principles
are seldom enunciated, and usually can only be surmised, the German
fondness for theorizing makes it easier to find statements of general
principles in the German than in the American literature.
The statutory grounds for denial of a license to an insurance com-
pany include failure to secure sufficiently the interests of the insured or
to show that the contract obligations can be continually fulfilled.2"2 From
this comes the frequently repeated statement that the purpose of regula-
ion is to protect the interests of the insured. Though there is no doubt
that protection of the interests of the insured, whatever that may mean
201. It should be apparent that speed is not a normal characteristic of the
German process. Revision of fire insurance AVB took from 1925 to 1929. 1926
VER6FF-NTLTCHUNGEN 146; 1929 id. 131-41.
202. VAG § 8 (1) Ziff. 2: "Die Erlaubnis darf nur versagt werden, wenn . . .
niach dem Gesch-ftsplan die Belange der Versicherten nicht ausreichend gewahrt oder
die Verpflichtungen aus den Versicherungen nicht genfigend als dauernd erfiillbar
dargetan sind.. .. "
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and involve, is the main thrust of this particular regulatory activity, it
leads to oversimplification and failure to understand the complexity of
the process if one fails to analyze the statement.
Of course any violation of law is forbidden, including alteration of
the compulsory provisions of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG),
or insurance contracts statute; semi-compulsory provisions may be altered
only in favor of the insured. But more broadly, there must be compli-
ance with general principles 'of public policy. Even a quick examination
of the files demonstrates at once the complexity of the purposes that are
reflected in this aspect of the regulatory process. Thus, when the intro-
duction of index clauses in insurance policies is considered, the Ministers
of Economics, Finance, and Justice are sure to be unhappy if they are not
kept informed. In 1926 the department refused to approve an index
clause for liability insurance contracts, providing for automatic premium
increases, on the ground that the index statistics used by the insurer
seemed not to be sufficiently reliable and that the department lacked the
power to decide a matter with such far-reaching implications in the field
of economic and financial policy.2"3  Similarly the department expressed
doubt as to insurance covering the replacement value of dwelling houses
and farm buildings, because it might make the public fearful of impend-
ing inflation." 4 Proposals to limit and narrow protection with respect
to demolition activities were justified on the ground that under postwar
conditions, in Germany the existence of broad insurance coverage had led
to negligence with adverse social consequences. An extension of cover-
age in sickness insurance was opposed on the ground that it would
tend- to lessen confidence in the medical profession. Objections to in-
surance against unexplained cash deficits were based on fear that it
would encourage embezzlement and negligence in dealing with money.20 3
These considerations, where not otherwise documented, were picked at
random from the files of the department, without any special search,
suggesting how frequently more general public policies come under con-
sideration and how much the simple statement that the process seeks to
protect the inter'ests of the insured must be explained.
The requirement that the interests of the insured be sufficiently se-
cured is understood to give the department wide scope to review all the
circumstances of the insurer's plan, including its economic and technical
203. 1933 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN 235. The insurers dropped the matter.
204. Zusammengefasster Geschiftsbericht fiber die Tftigkeit des Reichsaufsicbt-
samtes ffir Privatversicherung 1939 bis 1945, at 44-45 (Bundesaufsichtsamt fir das
Versicherungs- und Bausparwesen ed. 1955), hereafter referred to as 1939/45
Geschi.ftsbericht.
205. 1958/59 Geschfiftsbericht 48. See also PR6LSS, VAG § 8, notes 9, 13.
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soundness as well as the reasonableness of benefits and the danger that
the policyholder may be misled. For instance, approval has been denied
where there were not sufficient statistics to determine loss probability or
where the small number of subscribers made sufficient spreading of the
risk unlikely."'
As Prolss has rightly pointed out,2"7 the continual fulfilment of obli-
gations is a special consideration in protecting the interests of the insured,
in the longer view, as a member of the community of all policyholders.
In an old case, the department objected to a group life insurance contract
under which an association's members of ages 60-65 would be insured
without medical examination.0 8 In deciding upon the introduction of a
clause excluding suicide committed within the first two policy years, the
department stated that only the interests of the community of all insured
should be considered-those of individual policyholders or of small
groups of policyholders must be disregarded. 28 Although the language is
unjustifiably broad, the point is clear. The individual interest of the
policyholder includes the long range performability of his contract, which
appears in the guise of the common interest.
The problem of balancing individual and group interests (or the
short and long range interests of the individual) appears repeatedly. One
illustration is the treatment of suicide clauses in life insurance. , In sec-
tion 169, the VVG provides that the insurer is relieved of his obligation
to pay if the insured commits suicide while sane. But section 178 pro-
vides that section 169 may be modified in favor of the insured. Before
World War I, insurers voluntarily introduced clauses which excluded
coverage only if suicide occurred within the first one or two years of the
contract. Some companies proposed to abolish the exclusion altogether,
but the department insisted that the contract must exist for at least a year
before full payment might be made in case of suicide by a sane insured. 10
Only in industrial group life insurance, where all members of a club were
compulsorily insured for burial expenses, was unlimited suicide coverage
206. PR6LSS, VAG § 8, note llB.
207. Id. § 8, note 11. Cf. Starke, Die Entwcklungslnien der inateriellen Staatsauf-
sicht in der ersten Hiifte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in 3 FfiNFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE
VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEm GESETZ vom 12. MAI 1901 11, 60 (Rohrbeck ed.
1955).
208. 1908 VER5FFENTLICHUNGEN 113.
209. 1933 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 200. This was a decision on appeal of the insurer,
reversing a decision which had refused approval on the ground that there was no justi-
fication for reversing a favorable development.
210. See 1913 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 94, where the department even refused to ap-
prove a clause covering suicide occurring in the first year of a credit life insurance con-
tract. Later the department agreed that an amount not exceeding 500 Reichsmark could
be paid in this case. 1928 VERSrFENTLICHUNGEN 113-114.
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permitted.21' In the early 1930's, the economic crisis increased the suicide
rate, whereupon in 1932 the insurers submitted revised AVB which would
return to the stricter exclusion of the VVG. At first the department
refused approval, suggesting that the increased suicide rate could be com-
pensated for by extending the waiting period to five years or by limiting
the amount to be paid in case of suicide.212 Upon appeal, the Berufungs-
senat, (appeals commission) of the department reversed, finding that the
interest of the community of insured warranted the introduction of the
stricter exclusion clause and that the other proposed remedies were not
sufficient to meet the problem.1 3 The present AVB provide for full
payment after three years.
Another illustration of the tension between individual and collective
interests of the insured appeared during the inflation after World War I.
Currency depreciation led to an increase in administration expenses that
exceeded premium receipts. The department approved new AVB im-
posing upon policyholders the duty to pay for special services of the in-
surer and to bear postage expenses in case of inquiries.21 In industrial
life insurance it became uneconomic to collect premiums in the traditional
way by sending agents to policyholders' homes. Insurers tried to change
the collecting system; and the department, after some argument, approved
an amendment to the Geschiiftsplan by which policyholders were required
to pay at the insurer's office or else pay an extra fee for collection." '1
Later the industrial insurance lines were discontinued altogether, and
policyholders were asked to exchange their policies.21 In accident, lia-
bility, and property insurance, the department agreed with the insurers'
request for voluntary premium increases, at first requiring that each
policyholder agree expressly in writing. This method was soon aban-
doned as expensive and impractical, and it was only required that the
premium bill point out in clear language that the additional payment was
voluntary.21 However, the department declined to decide whether in-
surers could cancel the contracts of policyholders who refused to pay the
increase, feeling that this determination came within the province of the
211. 1927 VER6FIENTLICHUNGEN 126.
212. 1932 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 121-122. Cf. the more cautious attitude of the
Swiss department, which refused to approve a reduction in the suicide clause waiting
period. Eit Bundesgerichtsentscheid zur Deckung des Selbstliwrdrisikos in der Lebens-
versicherung, in 23 SCHWEIZERISCHE VERSICHERUNGSZEITSCHRIFT 39 (1955).
213. 1933 VER&FENTLICHUNGEN 199-200.
214. 1921 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 92-93.
215. 1920 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 212-214.
216. 1923 VER6 FENTLICHUNGEN 16.
217. 1920 VER6FENTLICHUNGEN 191. The department supported the insurers with
letters to policyholders. 1920 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 208-209, 1921 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN
11-13.
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courts. 21 s The department was reluctant to seek legislation affecting ex-
isting contract rights so long as there was hope that excess investment
profits and mortality gains could close the gap. It feared that such ac-
tion would alarm the public and would tend to discriminate among p6licy-
holders and lead to abusive competition. However, the department pre-
pared amendments to the VAG which were enacted in 1923, providing for
changes in existing contracts with the approval of the department. To
reduce expenses, the provision requiring a copy of the AVB to be de-
livered to the prospective policyholder was repealed. Since 1923, the de-
partment has retained this discretion to approve changes in existing
contracts. 19
As one aspect of protecting the interests of the insured, the depart-
ment has regularly followed, or at least enunciated, a policy of encourag-
ing constant extension and improvement of the coverage. 2' This policy
has led the department to encourage liberalization of the AVB and to re-
sist amendments that would withdraw extensions already granted. The
suicide clause already discussed provides an example. In burglary insur-
ance, the department forced the companies to assume the burden of prov-
ing violation of the duty to protect the insured property, thus going be-
yond the requirements of the WTG. The department's point was that
the AVB that existed when the VYG was enacted already contained simi-
lar provisions."' The provisions of the law were said to be mere minima
that might be altered to the benefit of the policyholder. The VVG im-
posed requirements consistent with insurance technique at the time of its
enactment, but constantly developing techniques warrant improvements in
218. Legislation for this purpose was prepared but proved unnecessary since
most policyholders paid voluntarily. 1921 VER6FFENTLICHTUNGEN 112-113. 1921
VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 91-92.
219. Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber die privaten Versicherungsunterneh-
mungen vom 19. Juli 1923, [1923] Reichsgesetzblatt I 684, Art. I Ziff. 1, repealing VAG
§ 10. See also 1923 VER6FENTLICHUNGEN 14-15, and Biichner, Die Entwicklhng der
deutschen Gesetzgebung ubcr die Verslcherungsaufsicht bis zun Bundesgesetz vore 31.
Jidi i95i, in 71 FONFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEl GEsETZ
vom 12. MAI 1901 1, 21-23 (Rohrbeck ed. 1925).
220. See 1953/54 Geschiiftsbericht 28. In a departmental note in preparation for
a Beirat meeting on Normativbedingungen for life insurance in 1955, appears the follow-
ing: "Dabei liegt der Auffassung des BAV die Uberzeugung zugrunde, dass die
gesetzlichen Vorschriften nur als eine Umschreibung des Mindestinhalts der Rechtsstel-
lung des Versicherungsnehmers angesehen werden kinnen, dass also die Tatsache, dass
das vor 50 Jahren erlassene VVG dem Versicherungsnehmer eine bestimmte Rechtsstel-
lung zuweist, die Aufsichtsbehirde nicht hindert, uach pflichtgeniissem Ermessen zu
verlangen, dass dem Versicherungsnehmer eine bessere Rechtsstelluhg eingerdumt wird.
V 'or allem aber sollen bereits geltende Verbesserungen der Allgeneiwne Versicherungs-
bedingungen aufrecht erhalten bleiben." Vermerk of 14 Nov. 1955 by Dr. Arnold, in
Akten betr. Normativbedingungen I: IV A 1 c, Band III. (italics added).
221. 1920 VER&FFENTLICHUNGEN 13-14.
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coverage which the department is obligated to make available to policy-
holders.
* However, the enunciated policy of encouraging greater liberality is
not always manifested in practice. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say
that there are countervailing policies that confine and limit the exercise
of the policy of encouraging greater liberality. Such are, for example,
the requirement that obligations be permanently capable of fulfilment,
and the prohibition against special favors which restrains experimenta-
tion with expansions of the coverage. The former is evident in an ex-
amination of the files, where requests of companies or insurance associa-
tions to modify language of the AVB in order to make an intended ex-
clusion more clear are often approved, despite the protests of associa-
tions representing policyholders. The files manifest a conservatism that
acts as a brake on the development of new and expanded coverage. An
illustration of this occurred in connection with the postwar development
of a technique of property ownership similar to our condominium. In
1954 the question was raised whether the AVB for general liability in-
surance could not be amended to cover liability claims among the various
owners in a building or by one of them against their manager when, as
would be usual, they were all common insureds with the manager in a
single policy. A clause in the AVB excluded claims against each other
by multiple insureds in the same policy. The trade association was re-
luctant to extend the coverage, ostensibly on the ground that there was
no liability. The department supported the association. After a year of
discussion, the matter seems to have been forgotten for two years, when
it was raised again and again dropped. Finally, in 1958, the question
was raised a third time and after some discussion about formulation a
special term was authorized by the department.222 The arguments against
the extension seem scarcely plausible to a stranger to the system. If lia-
bility is possible, then coverage is needed and companies should be en-
couraged to experiment with it, as some were willing to do. If liability
is not possible, then extension of coverage would cost the companies noth-
ing and would relieve many a property owner of worry. This position
was eventually reached; that it took five years to reach it on such a
trivial matter is a little startling.
It goes almost without saying that the interests of the insured require
clarity of expression in the insurance terms to enable him or his insurance
advisers to know what he is buying. Criticism in America of the "fine
print" and technicality of insurance contracts is legendary. In Germany
the regulatory process has as a major objective to ensure that the insur-
222. 1959 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN 135.
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ance terms are models of clarity and completeness, so that the AVB pro-
vide a complete picture of the coverage, its limitations, and the obliga-
tions of the insured. If terms are copied from the statutes, they should
include provisions in favor of the insured as well as of the company.22
At the same time completeness must be balanced by conciseness, for a
lengthy document will not be read. When a company uses modifying
clauses to the disadvantage of the insured, the department has urged that
amendments be made in the AVB, rather than having the policyholder
sign deviating application forms, as the statute permits for individual
cases.
224
This principle of clarity of expression is reflected in an objective
called Markttranspare=, or "transparency of the market," which, how-
ever, has even broader connotations. 2 ' This expression is frequently
used in German literature and in oral discussions of supervision problems.
Examination of the files soon makes clear that it is taken seriously. No
editorial change is too minor to be suggested by an official of the depart-
ment, if it will increase clarity and reduce the possibility of ambiguity.
After all issues of principle have been settled with respect to new AVB,
serious discussion will continue on questions of language long after most
Americans would consider the dispute no longer worth the trouble. For
example, in a recent file dealing with revision of Bedingungen for what
we would call a disability waiver of premium coverage, the questions
seriously raised and extensively discussed were whether the terms in
question should be designated "Besondere" or Allgemeine Bedingungen,"
and whether it was desirable to change their designation from "In-
validitdts"ztsat-bedinguge." to "Beru fsunifdhigkeitszusatzbedingunge."
(that is, from "invalidity" to "incapacity for carrying on one's profes-
sion"). These only illustrate the scrupulous care with which all ques-
tions of language are approached in this process. Whether Markttrans-
parenz is worth the effort expended to provide it is an open question.
There is much to be said for conceding the inherent muddiness of
language and accepting a rule in which ambiguous language is interpreted
in favor of the insured. But there is little doubt that the German effort
does produce remarkably well constructed contractual documents. They
are much clearer than ordinary German prose. Let no one think that an
achievement of little significance! The possibilities for disagreement are
reduced to an absolute minimum, and litigation over interpretation is cor-
respondingly rare. So sure are the companies and associations and the
223. 1909 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 100, 157; 1910 VERFFENTLICHUNGEN 83-84.
224. VAG § 10(3) ; 1911 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 89-90.
225. See Bischoff, op. cit. supra note 190.
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department about the meanings they have intended to communicate that
contrary interpretation by, a court is treated as an aberration, despite clear
recognition that as a matter of power the court has the last word. A tone
of indignation at the obtuseness of the court is readily observable in com-
munications respecting such cases. Contrariwise, it is not uncommon for
a court to request the department for an opinion on the meaning of the
language of AVB; and the department complies confident that it knows
better than the court what the language means. Courts seem to regard
such help as valuable.2 ' An important part of the activity of the depart-
ment consists of exchanges with the companies and associations over the
meaning of existing AVB. Occasionally, the changes produce sugges-
tions for reconsideration of the language. While the suggestions do not
always bear fruit, they sometimes initiate discussions that lead to more or
less thorough going reform.
A policyholder ordinarily has difficulty in evaluating the worth of
an insurance policy and comparing it with others, unless their terms are
the same. Though theoretically the law permits insurers to adopt indi-
vidual AVB, the value of uniformity in enabling the policyholder to know
the protection he is paying for has led the department to regard uniform-
ity as an important value. It is an aspect of Markttrasparenz, for a
market is hardly transparent when the relative values of related objects
are concealed in their variations. Deviations from Musterbedingungen
are therefore discouraged and sometimes prohibited, except where the
department thinks deviation represents real progress, and not a mere
"gimmick" for competitive purposes. This is true despite recognition by
the department that it has no unquestioned right to compel uniformity.
From the beginning of its activity the department encouraged uniformity
of contract terms and applied pressure to achieve it. When it began work
in 1902, AVB already existed in the major lines of insurance. When
the first forms were reviewed, the department required changes from
insurers using individual forms but not from insurers using the Ver-
bandsbedingungen in order to preserve such uniformity as there was. 27
Careful revision of all AVB was undertaken after enactment of the VVG
in 1908.22
226. See, e.g., 1910 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 272-74 (policyholder's coat damaged by
sparks from cigar, court asked department for definition of term "fire" in AVB);
1911 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 34 (court submitted question whether clause excluding trau-
.matic neurosis in accident policy violated moral and ethical standards). More recent
illustrations appear in department files.
227. 1903 VER6FFENTIICHUNGEN 110. In allowing use of the old "Verbandsbeding-
ungee" in fire and burglary insurance, the department expressed the hope that the in-
surers would apply objectionable clauses reasonably and not unfavorably to the insured.
228. 1910 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 79-84.
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The importance of uniformity depends in large measure on the na-
ture of the insureds. Large industrial enterprises, such as many buyers
of business interruption insurance, understand forms as well as insurers,
but not all small policyholders do. However, even for large buyers, uni-
formity is valuable to facilitate underwriting of large risks in multiplepolicies by numerous companies.22 Nevertheless, in sickness insurance,
where most policyholders are small, terms vary a great deal. Complete
Musterbedingungen do not even exist. This apparent anomaly is usually
explained, somewhat unconvincingly, as the product of the complexity of
the market for sickness insurance.
An incident in connection with the AVB of fidelity insurance shows
the importance of "the transparency of the market." Insurers were di-
vided into two camps and could not agree on uniform Musterbedingungen.
In 1956 the department approved two forms, leaving it to policyholders
to compare them.2"' However, three years later, insurers and policy-
holder associations agreed to prepare uniform terms and asked the de-
partment to help231
vi. Extent of Discretion. We have seen that the department, in
reviewing AVB, has room to exercise considerable judgment in determin-
ing whether the interests of the insured are sufficiently secured. This
judgment, however, lies within the realms of fact finding and interpreta-
tion and gives the department discretion because of the lack of precision
of language. In theory the license and approval of AVB may be refused
only if the requirements of the VAG are not met, as in America. The
insurer has a right to approval, and the department is bound to give it, if
statutory requirements are satisfied. 2  Of course the practical difficul-
ties in court review give the department considerable freedom of move-
ment in Germany as in America.
On the other hand, Pr5lss has said that the department may freely
decide to approve a form even where the requirements of the VAG are
not met.222 Thus the department approved the old association forms in
fire and burglary insurance for the sake of uniformity although their
terms were unfavorable to the insured.2 ' In this respect there is true
discretion. Even more striking, under section 81 of the VAG the depart-
ment has genuine discretion not only in the decision whether to act, but
229. 1955 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 154. This was also a main reason for the develop-
ment of the American standard policy. Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 180, at 691.
See also 1956 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 22.
230. 1956/57 Geschiftsbericht 43.
231. 1959 VERFFENTLICHUNGEN 130.
232. PRLSS, VAG § 8 notes 4, 9.
233. Ibid.
234. 1903 VER&FFENTICHUNGEN 110.
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also in how and how far.235 The section gives the department power to
enforce compliance with the Geschiiftsplan as well as to eliminate abuses
which threaten the interests of the insured or put the business in conflict
with moral standards. Under this broad provision the department can
effectively control objectionable practices, including policy forms, even
if they do not clearly violate specific provisions of the law or of the
Geschiiftsplan. A suggestion of violation from the department is usually
sufficient to lead the delinquent insurer to mend its ways.
vii. Implementation of Orders. Formal disapproval of forms is
rare. In most cases protracted negotiations lead to acceptable drafts; if
no compromise can be reached insurers are more likely to withdraw an
application than to press for a test case. Informal communications from
the department, as under section 81, often produce the desired results.
The department's range of remedies is extensive. It may issue un-
der section 81 a formal order prohibiting the specified practice. Com-
pliance is enforced according to general principles of administrative pro-
cedure by monetary penalties." 6 For repeated violations, the department
may prohibit further transaction of business or may appoint a receiver." 7
Finally, directors and executives are subject to criminal punishment by
imprisonment and fine if they conduct or acquiesce when their subord-
inates conduct business not described in an approved Geschdiftsplan. '3
Sometimes the department approves AVB in a modified form or
subject to conditions called Bedingunge. This is done when objections
are raised after the form is before the Beschlusskammer (formerly Beritf-
ungssenat) for final decision, and further delay seems unwarranted. Ap-
proval is only effective when the condition is met.2 9 The VAG also ex-
pressly permits approval accompanied by special orders called Auflageiz
concerning the conduct of the business. In this case approval does not
depend for validity upon compliance with the special order; it is effective
at once, and the order can be enforced separately.2"' A Beschlusskanmner
proceeding has been held several times in connection with Musterbedingun-
235. "Die Aufsichtsbeh6rde karn die Anordnungen treffen, die geeignet sind, den
Geschiiftsbetrieb mit den gesetzlichen Vorschriften und dem Geschiiftsplan im Einklang
zu erhalten oder Misstiinde zu beseitigen, welche die Belange der Versicherten gefahrden
oder den Geschiiftsbetrieb mit den guten Sitten in Widerspruch bringen." VAG § 81(2),
ziff. 1.
236. Verwaltungsvollstreckungsgesetz vor 27. April, 1953, [1953] Bundesgesetz-
blatt I 157, §§ 9, 11. The amount may range from 3 to 2,000 Deutsche Mark. The order
to pay becomes unenforceable if the insurer subsequently stops using the objectionable
forms.
237. VAG § 87.
238. VAG § 135(1), item 4.
239. See, e.g., 1909 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 277-278; 1930 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN
143-146; 1958 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 22, 35-37.
240. VAG § 8(3), and PIU6ss, VAG § 8 note 2.
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gen for life insurance. This is necessary as matter of law24' if the depart-
ment does not approve the AVB in full. For unexplained reasons, some
measure of disagreement has remained at a point where the department
thinks decisions should be reached. A Beschlusskammer is called, holds a
hearing, and makes a formal decision. In one such case, involving double
indemnity coverage, there was disagreement over the extent to which
disputed questions in claims practice should be settled by a panel of doc-
tors instead of by the regular courts. The company appealed from the
Kammer decision to the Administrative Court which affirmed the de-
partment's decision.
The possibility of approving AVB conditionally has provided an ad-
ditional and useful enforcement device. The department has sometimes
made it a condition of approval that companies submit stipulations con-
cerning the application of certain provisions of the contract to specified
cases. These stipulations, called Geschdftsplmmiissige Erkidrungen, are
then considered part of the Geschdftpla. Failure to follow them leads
to administrative sanctions. Geschdftsplanmnssige Erkidrungen have
been required for approval of almost every form of contract in matters
of technical and financial nature (for example, special loss reserves) and
of formal nature (for example, size and form of printing of documents
or reference to certain dangerous provisions of the contract).242 In gen-
eral, they are used to lay down rules which are too detailed or too com-
plex to insert in the AVB. The formulae and schedules for cash sur-
render values in life insurance provide illustration.24 Favorable develop-
ments can also thus be made available for the insured without a time
consuming amendment to the AVB. In this way fire insurers added
coverage against damage caused by falling aircraft, without extra
charge." '44 But the department will not permit changes to the detriment
of the policyholder in this way; they require actual amendment of the
AVB.245
Geschdftsplaniissige Erkliirungen create only public law obligations
of the insurer and give the policyholder no claim. He may not even
know of the stipulated benefits. For that reason the department states
that they ought to be used only temporarily and only if the benefits are
241. 3 DVO § 7.
242. See, e.g., 1952 VER6OFENTLICHUNGIEN 121-122.
243. 1910 VER&FFENTLICHUNGEN 81; 1957 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 58.
244. 1936 VER6FFENTLICHEUNGEN 84; 1937 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 83. Similarly, per-
sonal property insurance (Hausratversicherung) was extended voluntarily and without
extra premium a year before the contract was altered. 1953 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 176.
See also 1954 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 16, 53, 130.
245. Arnold, 1955 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 79-80.
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not of substantial economic importance.246
In some cases, the department has not obtained Erkidrungen, but has
simply expressed an expectation that the insurers will voluntarily follow
department principles, extending new benefits to old contracts, treating
policyholders equally, and assuming a liberal attitude in cases of under-
insurance.4
7
viii. Withdrawal of Approval and Revision of AVB. No express
provision in the law specifies whether the department may withdraw its
approval if it decides that it erred in granting it. Legal writers generally
answer affirmatively. It matters little, however, since section Sla of the
VAG expressly authorizes the department to demand amendments to the
Geschiiftsplan before any more contracts issue, whenever it seems neces-
sary for the protection of policy holders. No conditions of exercise of
this authority are stated, but it seems the only valid reason for demanding
a change would be that the AVB could not be approved if newly sub-
mitted. To allow any other reason to suffice would permit the limita-
tions of the approval section to be wholly displaced by section 81a.2"48
However, innovations and changes in circumstances may make adequate
terms inadequate.
Section 81a was added in 1937, and there are few reported cases
where the department has based an order on it. Even before 1937, the
department frequently requested changes in the Geschiiftsplan in the ex-
ercise of general supervisory authority, obtaining from the insurers
temporary Geschdftsplanmiissige Erkkirungen and eventually amend-
ments to the AVB. For instance, when in 1932 the Reichsgericht, or
supreme court, construed industrial accident insurance AVB, which in
general exclude infections acquired in the course of employment, to cover
those infections acquired by health service personnel from a patient's
coughing, the department asked all accident insurers to submit Geschiifts-
planmnissige Erkldrunge adopting the interpretation.24
A second provision of section 81a authorizes the department itself
to change or repeal a Geschdftsplan when necessary for the protection of
the interests of the insured; such changes are to affect existing con-
tracts." During the war this authority was exercised by the department,
246. Ibid.; 1956 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 215.
247. 1958 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 3-4 (coverage of replacement value in personal
property insurance extended to clothing and linen). In this case the overall decrease of
losses warranted the extension of coverage without additional charge, and possible
danger to solvency was not in question..
248. See PR6LSS, VAG § 81a note 1.
249. 1938 VER&6FENTLIcHUNGEN 102-03. Subsequent judicial extension led to a revi-
sion of the clause. 1939/1945 Geschiiftsbericht 26.
250. "Wen es zur Wahrung der Belange der Versicherten notwendig erscheint,
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and after the war by the various state insurance departments. While at
first it was used merely to make the benefits of new AVB available to the
holders of already existing contracts or to produce necessary amendments
to the bylaws of mutual insurers which were unable to gather a quorum
for ordinary action, it became, as time went on, a means of regulating
the insurance contract by unilateral administrative order, mostly used to
adjust contracts to the quickly changing situations of the war and post-
war periods. In these orders, the interests of the insurance fund were
often preferred to those of the individual policyholder. When the eco-
nomic situation stabilized, this broad power and its exercise met increas-
ing criticism. The various insurance departments then took the position
that the power was created, and should be used, only for extraordinary
situations where ordinary means were too slow.2 '
The Federal Insurance Department has adopted this restrictive view
and has refrained from using the power. An example of its restraint is
a circular letter to health insurers requesting them to waive the waiting
period requirements of the AVB in certain cases. The letter stated that
it was without binding force as an administrative order and that the de-
partment had chosen this form of action rather than that of a formal
order because of its reluctance to apply section 81a.2 '2
ix. Judicial Review. All department orders are subject to direct
judicial review. Where the president of the department has decided
alone, any person affected by the order may appeal to a Beschlwsskam-
mer."' All Beschlusskainner decisions, original as well as on appeal, may
be challenged before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, or federal adminis-
trative court, the highest court for administrative matters." 4 Its pro-
cedure is regulated by general statute. If the department has discretion
but has acted arbitrarily or otherwise abused its power, the court may
reverse and remand the case but may not issue its own order. However,
where the department's decision is not discretionary, as in control of
AVB under section 8, the court may replace the department's judgment
kann die Aufsichtsbeh rde einen Geschiftsplan mit Wirkung ffir bestehende oder noch
nicht abgewickelte Versicherungsverhiltnisse indern oder aufheben."
251. See generally Starke, op. cit. supra note 171, at 98-101; 1939/1945 Geschffts-
bericht 4.
252. Gesamtverband der Versicherungswirtschaft e.v., Geschiftsbericht 1959/60, at
120. The department also wanted to avoid a formal Beschlusskammer proceeding, neces-
sary for orders based on VAG § Sla.
253. 3 DVO § S. Selection of members of the Beirat and procedures are fixed by
3 DVO §§ 10-20.
254. BAG § 10a. A Beschlhsskammer decision is often merely a confirmation of
results reached by compromise. See, e.g., 1903 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 98. For a particu-
lar case in which a Beschhusskammer decided on AVB, see 1958 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN
35-37.
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with its own. The needs and interests of the policyholder, the touch-
stone under section 8, can be reviewed by the court and its own views
substituted for those of the department. In a recent case the department
declined to approve an accident form providing that the question whether
death was caused by accident should be decided exclusively and finally
by a panel of physicians. The department thought this provision detri-
mental to policyholders by denying them access to the ordinary courts.
When the company challenged the decision, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht
thoroughly discussed the interests of the policyholders and dismissed the
company's appeal.
255
Orders of the department are stayed pending decision of the court,
absent circumstances requiring immediate enforcement. 2 "8  Litigation of
this kind is rare, however. In 1957-1958 six proceedings before the ad-
ministrative court on all kinds of matters were reported; in 1958-1959
there were four; in 1959-1960, only three. In 1962 only two proceed-
ings were initiated.1 7
In suits between insurer and policyholder the courts must give effect
to the agreed terms unless they conflict with the compulsory provisions
of the VVG, which are self-executing, or private law provisions govern-
ing the legal relations of the parties. Agreed terms must be enforced by
the courts whether specifically mentioned in the contract or not; non-
conforming provisions are unenforceable against the policyholder. Ap-
proval of the AVB and the Geschdftsplan does not in itself affect the
contractual relationship, since they are matters of public law. Express
approval of a clause by the department does not prevent a court from
avoiding it as contrary to law or to public policy, according to general
principles of contract law. Nor does lack of approval by itself invalidate
the contract."'
Where the department has the exceptional power to make orders or
regulations immediately affecting the rights and duties of the parties to
the contract, courts must enforce the contractual changes thus effected.
If the department, under section 81a of the VAG, changes AVB affect-
ing existing contracts, existing contracts are forthwith governed by the
255. 1961 VER6F ENTLICHUNGE" 65-67.
256. On review, see BAG § 10a, and Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung vom 21. Januar
1960, [1960] Bundesgesetzblatt I 17. General review of administrative acts by an inde-
pendent court system was introduced after World War II. Before that no appeal lay
to a court; the insurers could only appeal to a Berufungssenat, composed of three de-
partment officials (among them the president), two Beirat members, and two judges of
existing courts.
257. 1962 Geschaftsbericht 4.
258. Reichsgericht, judgment of June 1, 1937, 155 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts
in Zivilsachen 138; PR6LSS, VAG § 10 note 8.
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new provisions, whether or not the insurer has amended the forms."'
Thus, in cases between insurers and policyholders, courts have not re-
viewed administrative acts. Direct, not collateral, attack in the special
administrative tribunals is the normal avenue for review of administra-
tive orders, except for such serious defects as that the order is capricious.
It is in a sense the converse of section 81a that the department has
and exercises a power to act in individual cases to protect companies
against policyholders. Section 89 of the VAG confers upon the depart-
ment the power to issue orders temporarily prohibiting payments on in-
surance contracts of any kind where this is necessary to prevent the fi-
nancial failure of the insurer.26 In life insurance, the department may
reduce permanently the amounts owed by the insurer to the policyholders,
either all or a specified group, in order to preserve the insurer's solvency.
The department exercised this authority during the inflation of the early
1920's and after World War II.2"
c. The Complaint Function of the Department.
Like the American insurance departments, the German department
has no power actually to decide disputes between insurer and policyholder
over contract terms. Complaints of policyholders are examined in the
department to find out whether there are violations of public law duties
to be handled by administrative action; for this purpose the insurer is
usually asked to state its opinion on the case. The complaining policy-
holder is sometimes advised to seek relief in court if the company does
not pay. Both parties are usually informed of the department's opinion. 
62
Complaints have decreased recently. While in 1952-53, 11,706 com-
plaints and inquiries were submitted, there were only 7,026 in 1959-60.
In 1962, the department received 3,813 complaints and 2,434 inquiries.
Of the complaints, 989 concerned life insurance, 1,182 health insurance,
and 1,370 liability, accident, and motor vehicle insurance. In addition,
many policyholders asked the department for information personally or
259. Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 2, 1951, 2 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (hereinafter cited as B.G.H.Z.) 55, and June 28, 1952,
6 B.G.H.Z. 373.
260. See Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of December 15, 1955, 1957 VER6FFENTLICH-
UNGEN 97-99, concerning an order based on VAG § 89.
261. The department used this power for the first time during World War I when
a company insuring against the risk of compulsory army service (a form of coverage
aimed primarily at meeting the financial needs of dependents) got into financial diffi-
culties. A temporary suspension of discounted advance payments was sufficient to pre-
vent failure. 1915 VEROFENTLICHUNGEN 86. For further examples see Starke, Die
Anordnungen der Verstchertigsaufsichtsbeh3rden nach den §§ 81, 81a, 89 VAG, in 1
FUNFZiG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICERaUNGSAUFSICHT NAcH DEM GEsETz vom 12. Mai
1901, 73, 101-03.
262. See Arnold, in 1953 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 71-72.
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by telephone. 6 '
.2. France
a. Rule-making Activity. The rule-making power of the French
department is not extensive. Moreover, it is no easier here than it is in
Germany or the United States to decide when such a power exists.
Constitutional doctrine has been uncertain in France during the years
of transition since World War II. Rules for administrative control of
insurance have been established by government decree based on extra-
ordinary delegation, more than by the parliament. Even the officials of
the Direction des Assurances are in doubt where the powers of the gov-
ernment end. The law of June 14, 1938, enacted by the regleinent
d'administration publique, or governmental regulation, of December 30,
1938,"4 confers upon the government broad powers to fix the details of
the policy approval requirement.
The Minister of Finance is authorized to impose upon insurance
companies the use of clauses types de contrat,265 or standard policy clauses,
but the power has not yet been exercised. Department officials regard
the provision as one established under extraordinary circumstances, con-
ferring authoritative powers where cooperation is imperative; as a result
they hesitate to apply it.2"' They think that conferences held during the
approval procedure provide a more flexible and less arbitrary method of
control.
However, this power has exceptionally been used to exert pressure
upon individual companies, as well as upon associations, during the ap-
proval process in cases where most companies have already complied with
the department's suggestions. In only four cases has the department
threatened the application of this power in a written communication.
Three of these letters were directed to insurers' associations. In the
letters the department insisted that the associations adopt its view and
referred to the ordonnance of September 29, 1945,2"7 without expressly
threatening to exercise the authority. The fourth letter (in 1954) was
directed to an automobile insurer which had submitted a policy excluding
coverage for damage to the car when operated 'by an unlicensed driver.
The department insisted that the exclusion was too broad and pointed to
the fact that other companies had adopted the more liberal view and that
if the company resisted the department would be forced to exercise the
263. 1952/1953 Geschiftsbericht 14-15; 1959/1960 Geschaftsbericht 18-19; 1962
Geschiiftsbericht 7-8.
264. D~cret du 30 d~cembre 1938, based on loi du 14 juin 1938, art. 3.
265. Ordonnance du 29 septembre 1945, Art. 8.
266. See OECD Statement (France) 39.
267. See note 265 supra.
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authority to impose a standard form. Although the department did not
prevail, no further action was taken in any of the four cases.
b. Rule-enforcing Activity-Review of Conditions Gin.rales des
Polices.
i. Scope of the Filing Requirement. Under an administrative
regulation promulgated in 1938, five copies of all printed material which
is to be distributed to the public or to policyholders must be submitted to
the Minister of Finance, who is authorized to prescribe modifications to
make the forms comply with the law.268 This provision is understood
to prohibit issuance of documents which have not been previously sub-
mitted. From the text it would seem that some affirmative department
action must precede use of the document. This seemed to be the official
view in 1962. According to internal instructions of that time, documents
were to be examined carefully, and the company informed by formal let-
ter that there were no objections. In 1964, however, the attitude was more
liberal. Department officials now emphasize the second portion of the
provision giving the department authority to prescribe modifications with-
out creating a duty to do so. Thus the department is now considered free
to decide whether to review certain documents at all. By this view, in-
activity of the department permits use of a new form, without implying
approval of its contents. In practice this is like the deemer provisions of
American statutes.
Though all kinds of documents must be filed, control in practice has
been concerned with the general policy terms; the other documents are
seldom reviewed because of lack of personnel. In fact, forms other than
policies are not even submitted by the companies, and the department has
not enforced compliance.
The French concept of conditions ginirales des polices, or general
policy terms, is very much like the German concept of AVB. In internal
instructions for the staff, the law is said to be applicable to stipulations
and clauses which are used regularly (more than ten times a year in in-
dividual contracts or more than once a year in group contracts), what-
ever their designation or placement or manner of reproduction may be,
in contrast to conditions particuitres, which are not subject to control.
But the department has not fully achieved even the review of general
268. D&ret du 30 d&embre 1938, Art. 181:
"Les soci&6ts ou assureurs doivent, avant usage, communiquer au ministre des
finances, qui peut prescrire toutes rectifications ou modifications n&essites
par la rtglementation en vigueur, cinq examplaires des conditions g~nrales de
leurs polices, propositions, bulletins de souscription, prospectus et imprim.s,
destines 6 tre distribu6s au public ou publi~s ou remis aux porteurs de contrats
ou adherents. .. ."
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policy forms. For instance, companies still decline to submit group in-
surance contracts even if applied more than once a year. Also, marine,
transportation, and fidelity insurers decline to submit policy forms to the
department.
In all these cases the insurers evidently violate the law. And yet the
Direction des Assurances has taken no measures to enforce compliance.
There seem to be two reasons for this lenient policy. The first is lack of
adequate staff, and the second is that the department desires to preserve
a cooperative relationship with insurers. This deficiency in effective
control may be one of the reasons for the current changes, the results of
which cannot yet be determined.
As a result of incomplete review resulting from failure to file forms,
the department failed for years to detect an objectionable practice by
which, between 1945 and 1955, insurance companies used premium re-
ceipts to announce contract modifications respecting the insured sum, the
premium rate, or the benefits granted. Often improvements in coverage
were combined with a premium increase; most policyholders paid the new
premium rate without objection. In 1952, an article in an insurance law
periodical described this practice and mentioned that it was contrary to
a provision of the law forbidding modifications of the insurance contract
except by an agreement signed by both parties."' Despite this fact, the
practice did not come to the attention of the policy examination section
before 1956; the department then acted promptly, issuing a circular stat-
ing that such modifications were unlawful in principle but would be
tolerated because of their simplicity and efficiency, provided certain con-
ditions were satisfied.
ii. The Process of Review. Although the regulation requires only
that copies of the documents be submitted to the Minister of Finance
before they are issued,2"' it has been understood that the insurer might
not use the forms before the Minister of Finance had taken definite ac-
tion, thus in effect establishing an express approval requirement similar
to those in the United States. Elaborate internal instructions regulated
the procedure to be followed. Because of the striking change in the in-
terpretation of section 181, the instructions are now being revised; the
work began in early 1964 and will probably not be finished before the
spring of 1965. The new instructions will certainly change the internal
jurisdiction in view of alterations in the department's organizational pat-
tern. There will also be some change in the types of documents to be
269. Thipaut, Les tendaices de l'assurance francaise depids la denzi~re guerre, 1952
RvuE GtAmNRLE DES AssURANCES TER Snms 331, 333; 1oi du 13 juillet 1930, § 8.
270. See note 268 supra.
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reviewed. Probably attention will be focused on certain lines of insur-
ance, leaving others alone. But there is not likely to be much change in
the procedure of review or in the goals the department seeks. There-
fore, it seems useful to describe the system as it has been operating.
Most forms are submitted by individual insurers for their own use,
but standard forms are sometimes submitted either by an association of
insurers (Groupeinent Technique) or by one company representing sev-
eral companies. If forms that have once received approval are printed
uniformly with a blank space at the top of the first page, on which the
individual company stamps its name, they may be used by any company
without further review; if a company reprints the form for its own use,
new filing is necessary.
In practice, standard forms are not used as frequently as in Ger-
many. A standard fire policy form, developed and repeatedly' revised
by the association of fire insurers with the advice and consent of the
Minister and in cooperation with policyholder representatives, is used
almost universally for industrial risks."' But only one fourth of the
companies used the standard form for ordinary risks; the rest developed
forms of their own. Recently, however, a set of standard policy forms
covering house owners' and tenants' risks have been developed by joint
action of the department and insurers' associations, without participation
of policyholders.272 In marine and transportation insurance, almost all
companies use English standard forms. There are standard policy forms
prescribed by law or by administrative order in compulsory liability in-
surance lines273 and in cinema insurance. In the other lines, no standard
policy forms exist,274 although in accident insurance and miscellaneous
risks considerable similarity may be found. The process of drafting or
revising standard policy forms seems to be painstaking and cumbersome,
less so than in Germany but more so than in the United States. A multi-
tude of drafts, revisions, and negotiations was necessary before the pres-
ent edition of the standard fire policy form was finished. 5
271. The Ligue des Assur6s, founded in the beginning of the century, was very
active in the drafting of the first standard fire policy form in 1912 while later revisions
were pushed mainly by the department. For details, see Besson, Les nouvelles conditions
genrales de l'assurance contre l'incendie, in 1941 REVUE G NwAIE DES AssRANCES
TFRUsTRES 376-391; Deschamps, Les noievelles conditions gnrales de la police-incendie
(M.F. 1959), in 1959 REvuE GLNtRALE DES ASSUANcEs TEmsEs 273-315.
272. For new standard policy terms, see 73 Bulletin Administratif des Assurances
53-139 (1963).
273. See Kimball & Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of
Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice, 39 IND.
L.J. 675, 713-15 (1964).
274. Deschamps, op. cit. supra note 271, at 274.
275. Id. at 314.
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In most lines of insurance, the officials of the Direction. des Assur-
ances have developed model policies and model clauses to use as examples
of sound drafting and as a basis for informal suggestions to insurer
representatives.
According to the internal instructions in effect until 1964, a pre-
liminary review to determine whether the insurer is licensed for the par-
ticular line of insurance and whether the documents are complete must be
made within three days of receipt of a filing by the department. If the
insurer is not licensed, it must be informed at once; where the documents
are incomplete, the insurer must be asked to submit the missing parts
within five days. The drafts are reviewed by lower rank civil service
officials. The internal instructions say that final review must be com-
pleted within a month from the date of receipt. Where this deadline can-
not be met, an appropriate superior official must be informed, unless the
insurer expressly agrees to further delay.
After review, the insurer is notified of the department's objections
or observations. The internal instructions expressly state that notifica-
tion shall be effected by direct and personal conversation rather than by
writing in order to avoid misunderstandings and to achieve a faster and
more complete exchange of views. This is usually done through a con-
ference between department officials and insurer representatives.
Since the Minister of Finance is understood to be authorized, under
the regulation of 1938, only to impose those modifications that are re-
quired by law, he may only enforce his views with respect to clauses that
do not comply with compulsory provisions of the law. Theoretically,
these provisions are self-executing (that is, they will be enforced by the
courts as private law rules). However, practical implementation of these
provisions requires administrative control, since few cases would get to
the courts if policyholders were not aware that their rights were not
limited to the terms contained in the printed contract form. In the inter-
nal instructions, this set of legal requirements is called the donahne r~gle-
mentaire. However, the criticism of forms is not limited to the doinaine
r~glementaire but also extends to other principles, called the doinaine
g~niral. Here, as acknowledged in the instructions, the insurer is not
bound to accept the opinion of the department, whose officials must rely
on persuasion. The instructions provide for different degrees of per-
sistence according to the importance of the objection. In the most im-
portant cases, if the insurer refuses to modify the form, the department's
opinion will be argued at a higher level by a superior official before the
form will be approved without the requested change. Where the objec-
tions are of less importance, they are raised only by the policy examiner
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but are repeated once or twice. At the lowest level of importance, the de-
partment's position is merely suggested but not pressed if the insurer
does not agree. The internal instructions deal with all lines of insurance
and all kinds of problems that may arise in the course of policy examina-
tion and state the kind and the degree of objections to be raised in various
cases. As a result of conferences between insurer and department of fi-
cials, the insurer submits a modified draft which is reviewed and dis-
cussed in the same manner until agreement is reached. Agreement seems
generally to be achieved, the internal instructions emphasizing the im-
portance of persuading insurers rather than giving authoritative com-
mands, even in the donzaiw riglementaire.
Unlike the German Bundesaufsichtsamt, the French Direction des
Assurances does not officially ask the advice of other persons about con-
trol of policy forms. Department officials consider themselves to be
the experts; they feel that no one else can see the full implications of the
problems. In rare cases, law professors of the University of Paris are
consulted on difficult legal problems, but unofficially and privately.
The final decision of the Minister of Finance is communicated to the
fnsurer by a letter stating that there are no objections against the pro-
posed form but making it clear that this means little more than a mo-
mentary absence of objections. The Minister of Finance thus remains
free to raise further objections later. The insurer is asked to put the
date of the approval letter on the printed forms, in order to identify ap-
proved forms. Finally, at this point the insurer is asked to submit five
copies of the printed forms to comply literally with the regulation.
Where an insurer has declined to comply with a suggestion in the
doinaine g~nural, it is often repeated in the letter of approval, as an indi-
cation that approval is granted reluctantly and a reminder that the depart-
ment adheres to its position. This riserve de principe has mainly psycho-
logical significance; it is also thought to lessen to some degree the dis-
crimination between companies that have complied and those that have
not.
iii. Basic Principles of the Approval Process. The bases for objec-
tions are stated in detailed instructions worked out for all lines of insur-
ance. For the donzine riglimentaire it is asked whether the contract pro-
visions comply with the compulsory provisions of the law2 76 as inter-
preted by the courts. Although these provisions are part of the contract,
deviating clauses notwithstanding, it is considered important that there
be no deviations, since few cases get to the courts.
276. Loi du 13 julllet 1930, Art. 2, provides that all provisions are compulsory with
few exceptions. See Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 273, at 719-20.
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Within the domaine giniral, the department seeks to realize a num-
ber of principles which, although not embodied in the law, are considered
to be important for the protection of the policyholder.
Some defects result from gaps in the protection the policies purport
to give. For instance, if a tenant's liability insurance policy enumerates
the statutory provisions from which the tenant's responsibility for dam-
ages may arise, and one provision is omitted without reasonable explana-
tion, the department will insist that the gap in coverage be filled.
Some defects result from construction problems. For example,
there will be objection to incomplete clauses which are likely to raise dif-
ficult problems of construction. The internal instructions also call for
objections when policy clauses are inconsistent, as where general policy
terms provide for one effective date and some particular provisions pro-
vide for another or where the title of a policy and its contents are in-
consistent. For example, a title promises "unlimited coverage" but the
policy contains numerous exclusions or there are inconsistencies between
the application and the policy. In combined policies covering multiple
risks, conditional clauses or exclusions may be justified for a particular
risk but are extended, perhaps inadvertently, to coverages where they are
inappropriate. For example, a clause respecting locked doors may seem
reasonable for burglary insurance but anomalous if applied to fire and
personal liability protection in the same policy.
Review within the domaine giniral also seeks to avoid ambiguity.
Finally, the department will object to clauses which it thinks contain
unjustified disadvantages to the policy holder. An example would be a
premium index clause written in such a manner that its effect was
doubled. This reflects a point of view akin to the German department's
effort to obtain a constant extension and improvement of the coverage.
iv. Power to Disapprove Concerted Action of Companies. The
Minister of Finance is authorized to forbid the implementation of insurer
agreements on general contract terms, as well as on premium rates, busi-
ness organization, competition, or financial policy."7 Such agreements
must be communicated to the Minister of Finance and may not take ef-
fect if he opposes them within one month. He may also oppose them
later, after consultation with the Conseil National des Assurances. This
provision has the same history and raises the same difficulties as the
power to impose standard clauses. It is used only reluctantly by the de-
partment. Few agreements are even submitted to the department, and
even those that are submitted are seldom disapproved.
One instance of disapproval was the case of an agreement of auto-
277. Ordonnance du 29 septembre 1945, Art. 9.
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mobile liability insurers for a general increase in premium rates. This
decision by the Minister of Finance was politically motivated by his in-
terest in opposing price increases in general rather than by considerations
of insurance economics. As a result, automobile liability rates became
insufficient, and the companies sustained heavy losses. In order to allow
the companies to recover from these financial reverses, the Minister of
Finance corrected his error by expressly approving a premium increase
to be implemented in a way contrary to generally applied principles by a
contract modification through stipulations in the premium receipts that
payment of the increased premium was acceptance of the modification.
Previous instructions and circulars of the department had expressed the
view that such procedure was contrary to the law allowing contracts to
be modified only by agreement signed by both parties of the contract.278
Nevertheless, the department had formerly approved such practices sub-
ject to conditions; these changes, involving an increase in premium with-
out significant addition to coverage, were approved also.
v. Implementation of Orders and judicial Review. Infractions of
the law of June 14, 1938, and of the regulations based upon it, may be
punished by fine. Until now, only one person has been fined because of
a violation of article 181 of the implementing government regulation of
December 30, 1938. The department is slow to enforce compliance with
the law, preferring to maintain friendly cooperation rather than to apply
coercive measures.
All orders of the Minister of Finance are subject to review before
the Conseil d'Etat for violation of law. However, the efforts of the de-
partment to maintain friendly relations with insurers, emphasizing per-
suasion rather than compulsion, has made review unnecessary; there has
not been a single case since the establishment of administrative control.
c. The Complaint Function of the Department. Complaints of
policyholders and others are treated by the section of the department hav-
ing jurisdiction to license companies. There is a steady flow of com-
plaints, perhaps half of them unjustified. The procedure is much like
that followed in Germany. Where a complaint shows that certain policy
provisions are being construed in a way prejudicial to policyholders, the
policy examination section is notified so it can ask for a modification of
the contract terms. Emphasis on persuasive measures has kept any for-
mal or systematic "jurisprudence of complaints" from developing in
France.
278. See text accompanying note 269 supra.
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IV. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Many of the ways in which a legal system confines and channels the
contracts constituting the matrix of a complex financial institution such
as insurance are so subtle as to defy detection; none are susceptible of ac-
curate measurement. A comparison of systems then adds a new dimen-
sion to the problem, for the data from different systems does not fall in-
to neat parallel classifications. Disparate patterns emerge from the raw
material and touch only at certain points. But even the differences are
illuminating. Despite the inherent limitations of such a study and the
inevitable subjectivity of judgment, there may be considerable suggestive
value in such conclusions as can be reached from this article and from
the earlier related one.279
A recent incident suggests the nature of the problem created by com-
peting insurance policies with different provisions of varying merit.
Health insurance coverage is offered to the New York public by almost
two hundred different organizations, from commercial insurers to inde-
pendent medical service groups. Most of these insurers offer a variety
of contracts, so that any purchaser of health insurance might have several
hundred potential policies to buy. In 1961, the Sloan Institute of Hospi-
tal Administration at Cornell University began a study to determine the
feasibility of rating or grading such policies on their benefits and other
provisions, to guide the general public. In 1964, interim publication in-
tended to report progress in developing the rating technique led to public
controversy."' Newspaper stories produced consternation in insurance
circles, because it was widely assumed that a final rating was being given
not only to the hundred policies used but indirectly to insurance com-
panies. 8' The report makes clear how difficult it is to buy wisely. Still
one view sees this diversity as desirable, leading to much experimentation,
with an opportunity to develop, eventually, the coverages best for the pub-
lic. Follman expresses this point of view:
Each type of insurer has its distinct approach, providing
the buyer of insurance the opportunity to choose the kind of
plan best suited to his needs. While the resulting heterogeneity
can, at times, present an impediment to a ready, simplified
understanding of the subject, it is necessary to recognize that
many aspects and concepts of private health insurance are rela-
279. Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 273.
280. YOUNG, A STUDY OF HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIEs AvAILABLE IN NEW YORK
STATE FOR THE PURPOSE Or DEVELOPING A PROCEDURE FOR THEIR EVALUATION AND GaD-
INo (1964).
281. See, e.g., Insurance Advocate, Aug. 8, 1964, p. 25.
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tively recent, that some must still be looked upon as experimen-
tal, and that this form of insurance, like medical care itself,
must remain in a dynamic state of evolution . . . The keen
competition that exists among insurers of all types in the United
States has spurred experimentation to devise new and broader
coverages and approaches. It has made private insurers re-
sponsive to changing needs and to the rapid evolution that pro-
ceeds in the provision of medical care.2"2
Others, including the authors of the Sloan Institute study, express doubt:
The effect on the public has been, however, to create a
state of confusion, because of the bewildering diversity of in-
surance benefits and policy provisions which confronts the aver-
age person as he examines a policy. In most cases, he is not
able to determine the type of protection, or the extent of cover-
age, that he or his family needs; he does not understand the
significance or the effect of the restrictive clauses; he is un-
aware of important omissions in particular policies. As a re-
sult, this average person is unable to decide in a rational man-
ner what kind of policy to buy; he cannot make an accurate
evaluation of his rights and benefits under a given policy, nor
is he able to make a valid comparison of his rights and benefits
under one policy with those offered in another.
Frequently, he reaches his decision to buy or reject a policy
on the basis of the premium cost, or of one single feature or
another in a policy (such as the size of the maximum benefit),
only to discover, when illness strikes, that his coverage is of the
wrong kind, or is grossly inadequate, or that the generous
maximum allowances stated in the policy are hedged about with
restrictive clauses which effectively negate a large part of the
expected benefits."'
Although health insurance is more complicated than most coverages,
the problems of other lines differ only in degree. Basically the issue is
how far the law should police the insurance market. The values of ex-
perimentation and of freedom of contract compete with the pressing need
of the policyholder for protection or, at least, for information. Some-
how the policyholder should be enabled to make an intelligent choice.
There can be little quarrel with any of these goals; the problem is
282. FOLLMANN, MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH INSURANcE, at 117 (1963).
283. YOuNG, op. cit. supra note 280, at 3.
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one of balancing the conflicting goals or objectives of insurance regula-
tion. They are too numerous and too complex to be treated exhaustively
here. We sketch only those with direct relevance to control of contract
terms."'
A. Objectives of Control.
1. Freedom of Contract. To the extent that it is effective, any
regulation of the content of the insurance contract impairs the freedom
of the parties to determine the terms themselves. In this century, free-
dom of contract has lost its place as a preferred goal of the legal system.
Most insurance men think of insurance as performing a public service,
and objections to control of policy terms are usually put in terms of the
need for experimentation and flexibility. Though freedom of contract
is now only one goal among several, it still cannot be ignored; it creates
one of the basic conflicts to be resolved by the makers of statutes, who
must weigh the advantages of restrictive legislation against the impair-
ment of freedom.
Of course, in practice freedom of contract may mean only the free-
dom of one party to dictate terms. Inequality of bargaining power has
been a main justification for the prescription of contract terms in all
countries.285 But in insurance, large policyholders customarily deal on
even terms with insurers; sometimes they may even have an advantage.
Moreover, though the small policyholder can not negotiate he can shop
around; if the market is competitive, any product will be provided if de-
sired by enough people at an adequate price. Also equality in bargaining
power, lost in the relationship between insurer and individual policy-
holder, is re-established on a higher level when policyholders in combina-
tion deal with insurers. In Germany at least, groups of policyholders play
some role in the formation of AVB.
Freedom of contract is both a value in itself and a means of preserv-
ing the values of invention and experimentation. The contrasting dangers
of speculative innovations and of stagnation present to legislatures and
commissioners a difficult conflict of values. Choice or reconciliation of
them requires careful evaluation of the practical consequences. Instances
we have seen are the fate of the New York law prescribing standard life
policy forms, abolished three years after enactment because it curbed un-
284. Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regidatio: A Preliminary Inquiry in
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 471 (1961), examines the problem ex-
tensively.
285. It is interesting to note an effort to redefine "liberty" to include "the right to
contract upon equal footings." Woodson, J., concurring in State ex rel. Merchants Re-
serve Life Ins. Co. v. Revelle, 260 Mo. 112, 168 S.W. 697, 699 (1914).
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duly the improvement of coverage, and the modem practice of allowing
statutory standard provisions to be replaced by provisions more favorable
to the insured. One may also point to the proposal to replace detailed
statutory requirements by a broader discretionary power in the insurance
commissioner so that he can intervene where he must but leave the ma-
jority of insurers free from harassment. In Germany freedom for de-
velopment was explicitly weighed when the legislature conferred general
powers instead of regulating all details by statute."' But the administra-
tive agency continues to face this conflict. Study of the German approval
of AVB shows explicit concern with the problem, though the German
department seems not to give enough weight to the need for freedom to
experiment.
2. Substantive Protection of the Policyholder.
a. Solidity of the Insurer. The most important goal of insurance
regulation as a whole is the preservation of the solidity of companies in
the long term interest of the policyholders as a group. This objective ap-
pears in many forms, such as the solidity or solvency of the insurer or its
capacity to perform its obligations.28 Under the name of the Gefahren-
gemeinschaft, or "community of insureds," this objective has received
some explicit recognition in German regulation of contract terms. 8 Else-
where, too, though less often explicitly mentioned as an objective and
sometimes ignored by courts, it plays an important role, mostly as a limit-
ing factor, for regulation in the interest of the individual policyholder
(that is, his short run interest in maximum coverage for minimum cost)
cannot be allowed to prejudice unduly the interest of the community of all
policyholders (which is also the individual policyholder's long run in-
terest) in the preservation of a solvent going concern. Sometimes, with
inadequate thought, the objective is expressed as one of preserving the fi-
nancial soundness and economic strength of the insurance industry 89 or
even the "interests of the insurer," but the real aim is to see that the in-
dustry is not disabled from performing its necessary social function,29
286. See the passages from the official comment on the bill for the Versicherungs-
aufsichtsgesetz, in Materialien zum Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, Entwurf des Gesetzes
(Begrfindung 34-44 (1900)), partly reproduced by Bilchner, Die Entwickheng der deuts-
chem Gesetzgebung jiber die Versicherungsaufscht bis zurn Bundesgesetz vore 31. Juli
1951, in 1 FfONFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VER.SICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEm GESETZ VOld
12. MAI 1901, 1, 16-18 (Rohrbeck ed. 1952).
287. Kmiball, supra note 284, at 478.
288. 1 BRUCK-116LLER, KOmMENTAR ZUMT VERSICHERUNGSVRTRAGSGESETZ § 1, note
4 (8. Auf1. 1961).
289. SEWARD, in INSURANCE, A TEXTBoox 1019-1020 (Fricke ed. 1898) ; Starke, Die
Entwickvlugslinien der inateriellen Staatsaufsicht in der ersten Halfte des 20. Jahr-
hunderts, in 3 FONFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT NACH DEM GESETZ
vot 12. MAI 1901, 11, 65-69 (Rohrbeck ed. 1955).
290. Read, in 1931 NCIC PROCEEDINGS 67.
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which cannot be achieved without financially sound insurers. This aim
necessitates adequate premiums. Inadequate premiums do more harm
to policyholders than excessive premiums. This aim also suggests the
exclusion of bad risks. The German department has upheld the insurer's
right to cancel health insurance contracts after a sickness indicating a
great likelihood of heavy future claims on the ground that a general pro-
hibition of such cancellations would serve the few bad risks to the prej-
udice of all other policyholders.2 9' Like arguments have been used to
justify suicide clauses in life insurance and clauses excluding neurosis in
accident insurance.292 On the other hand, contemporary American de-
velopments respecting cancellability tend to ignore the interests of the
"insured community."
b. Protection of the Policyholder vis-a-vis the Company. In view
of the weak position most policyholders have relative to the insurer, regu-
lation is concerned with the aequum et bonum of the contract,29 i.e. the
legal system may seek to insure that insurance companies treat the whole
body of policyholders "reasonably" or groups of policyholders "equit-
ably" by applying only appropriate classifications or individual policy-
holders "fairly" in the application of contract terms.
In the United States, great weight is placed on the "reasonableness"
of the contract-it is a main purpose of rate regulation, for example.
There is much less interest in Europe in insuring that benefits and pre-
miums bear a reasonable relation to one another.
Another aspect of "reasonableness" more relevant here is protection
of the policyholder against contracts which do not give him the kind or
amount of coverage he may reasonably expect, because conditions and ex-
clusions provide the insurer with technical defenses. This has been an
important factor in the supervision of insurance contracts from the be-
ginning, both in the United States and in Europe. The Michigan statute
of 1881 expresses it in two points: "fairness and equity" in general and,
in particular, the "avoidance of conditions, the violation of which by the
assured would, without being prejudicial to the insurer, render the policy
void or voidable at the option of the insurer."294
Measures taken include the prohibition of certain exclusions from
the scope of coverage, the granting of grace periods and nonforfeiture
benefits, control of procedures in making application, in cancelling, and
291. 1930 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 120.
292. See notes 210-13 supra and accompanying text.
293. Kimball, supra note 284, at 486.
294. Mich. Pub. Acts 1881, No. 149, § 2. It should be noted that the term "fair-
ness" in this statute is what we have called "reasonableness." It is only important that
the terms be used consistently within a given framework.
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in settling losses. The question is less whether the benefits promised cor-
respond to the premium paid (a deficiency remedied most easily by a re-
duction of premiums), than whether the contract gives the policyholder the
protection he needs. Considerations of "reasonableness" may be ground
for objection, despite an appropriate premium rate, if the policy contains
far reaching exclusions or unwarranted qualifications of coverage.
The principle of reasonableness usually operates through statutory
minimum requirements, but it has more extensive application. Thus the
German insurance department, under its general power to see that the
interests of the insured are sufficiently secured, has pursued a policy of
improving coverage beyond the statutory minima. This power is broader
than that conferred upon many American commissioners to disapprove
"unjust" or "unfair" provisions. Many American courts seem unlikely
to sustain a commissioner's order requiring more generous coverage than
is fixed by statute, but there is a discernible inclination for insurance de-
partments to encourage expansion and resist contraction of coverage, even
if the legal power to do so is doubtful. Similarly the French department
has no weapon but persuasion to oppose to unjustified exceptions and ex-
clusions, in the doinaine ging-ral, but it persuades if it can.
In the United States the related goal of providing "equity" (that is,
of preventing discrimination against classes of policyholders) is also ex-
tensively sought. In life insurance, persons who belong in the same group
in respect to age and health may not be treated differently. 9' In Ger-
many, a right of the insured to be treated without discrimination is par-
ticularly established for mutual associations as a consequence of the mem-
bership concept. German stock companies have no express duty not to
discriminate. -11 Where the statute forbids the granting of special ad-
vantages or benefits in connection with a particular insurance contract,
it does so mainly to promote fair competition, rather than equitable treat-
ment of policyholders, though the latter objective is not irrelevant.29 In
general, however, questions of equity are left to management to decide.
3. Public Policy in General.
The requirement of solidity is not the only one to interfere with or
support freedom of contract. Various public policy objectives can be in-
volved. Contract-regulating provisions may control competition in the
marketplace, not only among insurers but in other economic fields. "98
Ethical or moral objectives are relevant, as in prohibiting unrestricted
295. E.g., Wisconsin regulations prescribe that policies may be disapproved if they
are "unfairly discriminatory." Wis. ADM. CODE, INS. § 6.05(5) (a).
296. VAG § 21, and PRLSS, VAG § 21 notes 1, 5.
297. Id., § 81 note 13.
298. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12080 (1957).
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coverage of suicide in life insurance or coverage that would encourage
fraud or criminal offenses. Any public policy may, in a proper case, have
an impact upon the legal control of policy terms. Thus, the New York
department issued a circular letter prohibiting inquiries about the race,
creed, color, or national origin of anyone dealing with insurance com-
panies, whether it was done by the companies themselves or by credit
agencies working for them.290
Preservation of vested rights is an important value in most legal sys-
tems and is imbedded in the constitutions of some, such as the United
States. Here control of policy terms can not generally interfere retro-
actively with existing contracts, though there are exceptions, such as the
commonly enacted depression statutes that suspended or authorized an of-
ficial to suspend the payment of cash surrender values or the making of
policy loans by life insurance companies and extended the time for pay-
ment of premiums.00 The broadest power of this kind exists in Ger-
many, but identical public policy considerations have kept the German
department from exercising it since the difficult days after Wrorld War II.
Is such reluctance to interfere with existing contracts justified?
"The essential mutuality of all insurance,"3 1 as recognized in the German
Gefahrengemeinschaft, or community of the insured, sometimes justifies
intervention for the protection of the common interest, just as it repre-
sents a countervailing policy to the policy of protection of the individual
policyholder vis-A-vis the company.
Why do legal systems seem to differ so much in the goals sought?
The major disagreement seems to be in the weight accorded freedom of
contract. In Holland and England it seems to rank above all other values
and there is almost no interference with contract terms; in Germany,
France, and the United States it is outweighed by other values. This
may represent less an ideological difference than special circumstances in
the insurance markets of Holland and the United Kingdom that make
freedom to compete for international business an important goal of the
state. For any western state where international insurance activity is
small relative to the total, the balance of values would probably come out
much as in the United States, Germany, and France. It is noteworthy
that in the United States the most effective pressure to free contract
299. Circular Letter 5 (1964), Feb. 14, 1964; New York Ins. Dep't Monthly Bul-
letin, March 1964, p. 2.
300. KIMBALL, IN sURANcE AND PUBLIC POLICY 189 (1960). The statutes were not
necessarily constitutional, but that issue did not arise. But cf., Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933), upholding a depression-born mortgage mora-
torium statute against a challenge based on the contracts, due process, and equal protec-
tion clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
301. PROCEEDINGS, FIRE UNDERWRITERS' Ass'N OF THE NORTHWEST, 1896, at 29, 32.
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terms from control has come in connection with the international and
interstate aspects of the business, where restrictions on freedom of con-
tract can be most felt as an impediment to the smooth flow of commerce.
B. The Methods of Administrative Control
Among the countries discussed here there is great similarity in the
objectives sought by the law. There is less similarity in the methods of
achieving them.
1. Transparency of the Market.
A fundamental dichotomy reflects the difficulty of balancing con-
flicting values in regulation of policy terms. The objectives of solidity
and protection of the policyholder vis-A-vis the company would lead to
compulsion; the goal of freedom of contract and the desirability of main-
taining flexibility and permitting creative experimentation would lead to
reluctance to compel. One possible way to reconcile the objectives is to
seek what the Germans call Markttrasparenz, or transparency of the
market. The market should be such that the buyer can make a rational
choice. This requires essentially that the competing products in the mar-
ket should be comparable. It comprehends a variety of related but sep-
arable ideas. Thus, disclosure of full information about the contract
prior to its formation is important. Clarity of terms is essential, and
uniformity is helpful. Each of these deserves separate mention.
a. The Role of Disclosure and Formal Requirements. Often a
sophisticated buyer can protect himself better than the law can protect
him, provided he has adequate information in advance of contract forma-
tion, though the complexity of insurance contracts raises some doubts
about disclosure's adequacy as a complete solution. Only a few systems,
notably that of the United Kingdom, have been satisfied with it. But it
is used everywhere as a supplementary device.
Disclosure can also be compelled after contract formation to facili-
tate enforcement of whatever contract rights the policyholder may have.
These "formal" requirements. 2 compel inclusion of certain provisions in
the contract or prescribe the way they should be included. Though they
come too late to aid the policyholder in deciding whether to buy, they
enable him to know and protect his rights better.
Formal requirements are utilized rather generally in the systems ex-
amined, but in different ways. France prescribes by statute that certain
provisions be printed with prominence in the contract. In Germany,
statutes do not require disclosure, but insurance departments compel it
under their general powers.
302. Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 273, at 688-90 passim.
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It is doubtful if formal requirements or disclosure can be more than
a supplement to compulsion for policing the terms of insurance contracts.
Even in a competitive market the ordinary policyholder is deceived or
misled too easily for competition to lead to rational choices; the problems
arising from life insurance specialty policies demonstrate this point
conclusively." 3
b. Uniformity and Clarity. Uniformity of terms is corollary to the
fundamental goal of protection of the policyholder vis-A-vis the company.
Like disclosure, it aims at rational choice. Uniformity also has value in
simplifying the regulatory task. Without substantial uniformity the job
of the German department would become impossible because of the cum-
bersomeness of its procedure. For different reasons there also is a tend-
ency toward uniformity in the United States. Standard fire policies
sought to simplify loss settlement where different insurers were involved;
this may also be the aim of provisions authorizing the commissioner to
make endorsements uniform. Some degree of uniformity is also produced
by standard provisions laws. But in general, the American commissioner
is not entitled to demand uniformity."0 The differences in the power
granted to the regulatory agency, the structure of the industry, and the
methods of control produce a result unlike the German one. No substan-
tial pressure towards uniformity is exercised in France either.
It would be easier to produce uniformity if it were clearer what
should be compelled. If the desirable attributes of a particular kind of
insurance coverage were settled, then it would be desirable to compel all
companies to conform to them in order to render competition meaning-
ful. Since the most meaningful comparison is a price comparison, the
elimination of all other variations has a certain obvious advantage. On
the other hand, such compulsion presents dangers. First, competition in
forms can help produce the best possible coverage. Second, some cover-
ages-specifically health insurance-are still experimental; and prema-
ture constraint prevents development. Perhaps reasonable flexibility and
room for competition could be coupled with reasonable freedom in the
market if standard provisions were developed for most policy terms, leav-
ing only a limited number of points on which competition would be free;
in those areas there should be an obligation to point out clearly how one
policy differs from others.
Transparency of the market presupposes clarity of expression. In
America, this is an objective of insurance regulation, though less self-
303. Kimball and Hanson, The Regulation of Specialty Policies in Life Inswance,
62 MicE. L. REv. 167 (1963).
304. Sulpra, text at note 91.
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consciously formulated and less assiduously sought than in Germany.
In general, the requirements that affect mainly the format of the
preliminary negotiations and the form or language of the contract rather
than its substantive content do not conflict with the principle of freedom
of contract. This is a good reason to prefer them to substantive compul-
sion. The conflict with freedom of contract is much more substantial in
the case of the uniformity requirement since it does more than merely
seek effective communication.
2. Factors Relating to Organization and Procedure.
In the United States, a determination whether the task of regulating
national policy forms can be done better at the federal or at the state level
will certainly be the most negligible of factors in a high political decision
whether to continue state regulation of insurance or to change to a na-
tional system. Nevertheless, the place where control is exercised is rele-
vant to its success and to the choice of the most appropriate techniques of
control. Some of the special problems of insurance regulation in the
United States arise from the fact that control is at the state level. For ex-
ample, the fact that it may take months or even years to get a new form ap-
proved in all states militates against inventiveness and experimentation,
especially with respect to large interstate risks where it would most natur-
ally take place. Thus in order to make the system of state control work
without damage to business enterprise, there is considerable pressure to-
ward freeing at least the interstate risks from the necessity of form regu-
lation. A system of national control would eliminate that particular diffi-
culty. Moreover, elimination of duplication of effort would also be a net
gain in a single national system. A national agency would make possible a
substantial upgrading of the caliber of personnel involved in insurance
regulation. We think we can see a striking difference between the average
quality of decision-making personnel in American and European insur-
ance regulatory agencies, the advantage being clearly on the European
side. No doubt an important reason is the wider choice the European
agency has in obtaining staff members, since the entire country can be
drawn upon. This is a factor of importance to form regulation, for to
do that job well requires both knowledge of the insurance business and
some legal sophistication.
Elimination of duplication of regulatory activity, upgrading of per-
sonnel, and elimination of the special problems created by interstate ac-
tivity in a federal system would be the principal advantages to the process
of form regulation of a shift to a national regime of control. A national
control agency would make feasible the larger investment of time in each
form that is characteristic of the German system by reducing greatly the
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total volume of work. However, the German system should not be
adopted without considerable modification, despite the merit in its em-
phasis on and achievement of substantial clarity in contract terms.
Variation in the statutorily required provisions of contracts and in
judicial construction of contracts also creates difficulty for a nationally
operating business. The degree of success attending the effort to achieve
uniform legislation about contract provisions emphasizes the problems
caused by diversity in this sphere and also shows how much cooperation
can accomplish when the states share a language and to a marked degree
a common legal system.
In the Common Market, however, the tenacity of existing institu-
tions, so long as they work well enough to be tolerable, together with the
difficulties created by disparity of language and of legal systems, will
undoubtedly delay even this solution. How far the American states have
come in solving the problem of insurance regulation in a federal system
can best be appreciated by looking at the problems Europeans have yet to
solve in "harmonizing" their laws enough to make a greatly enhanced
volume of international insurance business practicable.
There is more formality in the German process than in the Ameri-
can. This manifests itself first in the clear distinction between public law
and private law measures for control of insurance policy terms. It ap-
pears again in the organization and procedures of the insurance depart-
ment. Whereas the typical American insurance department, however
skillfully organized and managed, operates informally and flexibly, the
German department is highly structured and formal. Organization and
procedure is in part statutory, and the remainder is explicitly set out in
formal implementing Verordnunigen or legislative orders."' Though in-
formal negotiation plays a part in German regulation, the process is car-
ried out before the backdrop of a formal power structure that lies in plain
sight. Formality of organization and procedure is undoubtedly one of
the factors responsible for the particular way in which German regulation
has developed. Though each insurance company is obligated to submit
each contract for approval, this submission is necessarily a routine mat-
ter, since the elaborate and formal procedure for approval of AVB would
be impossible for hundreds of individual submissions. American filings
are also handled to some extent in groups by bureaus and boards, but not
as completely as German filings are. The number of filings that must
actually be examined and individually approved in the United States is
much larger than in Germany. Thus when one American commissioner
recently proposed to his staff that approval of policy forms containing a
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certain kind of provision be withdrawn, the difficulty of locating all such
policies (within a single minor branch of the business) was one of the
important practical considerations involved in the department staff
discussion.
In part the less formal and structured American process reflects
greater flexibility and adaptability; in part lesser efficiency and ade-
quacy. Except in our largest states, regulation is less well financed and
staffed than in Germany, with fewer professional staff members of high
quality. Though control of policy terms is a legal job, it is done in most
American departments without using lawyers. In the United States the
work would be too routine to attract qualified professionals even if sal-
aries were larger. In Germany it is possible to have lawyers deal with
this problem because they have higher status and because the work is
structured to have intrinsic interest. The American system would be bet-
ter if lawyers were more extensively used.
The personal characteristics of the insurance commissioner, perhaps
derived partially from the nature of his training, affect the way insurance
regulation develops. For example, in Germany (as in New York) the
commissioner has traditionally been a lawyer. This tends to focus the
department attention on the desirability of a regularized procedure. Law-
yers have other faults but they tend not to be arbitrary. Actuaries as
commissioners would have somewhat different characteristics, former
agents still others. The German commissioner is usually promoted from
the civil service, while the American commissioner tends to be a political
appointee. This also would have an effect, though an unpredictable one.
In the United States where there is more flexibility, less professionalism
in the department, and more frequent change of commissioners than in
Germany the effect of the commissioner's personality would tend to be
increased, though his lesser competence (where it is less) and the more
frequent change (in some states) would tend to lessen the effect.
There is a striking contrast in the level of participation of academic
personnel in regulation. In Germany institutionalized procedures lead to
extensive use of academicians. Seldom are new AVB approved in Ger-
many without participation of and advice from one or more distinguished
teachers. In France, though structural similarity of the legal profession
and the high status of academic personnel would make it easy to make
effective use of such people, they are in fact rarely used. It is not sur-
prising that in the United States academic personnel have seldom been
used; the times may be changing, but the few exceptions are not frequent
enough to prove it for the state level, though recent appointment of a
professor as commissioner in Michigan is suggestive.
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General inadequacy of American insurance departments has led
legislatures to play a larger role in the control of insurance contracts here
than in Europe. There the legislature did little more than (1) state a
framework of insurance contract law, which in the United States has
been developed by the courts, and (2) set up machinery for administra-
tive regulation. The German insurance contract code is largely ius dis-
positivum because in enacting it the legislature could rely upon a function-
ing and effective insurance department with broad powers; specific legis-
lative control of contracts was less necessary. Like ours, the French in-
surance contract statute contains much more ius cogens than the German
because the French department was not yet established at the time of
enactment.
In the United States the legislature tinkers frequently with the law
of insurance contracts. The result is a jumble of unsystematic legisla-
tion. In view of the constant legislative involvement, it is curious that
there appears at first glance to be greater scope for rule-making by
American insurance departments than by the German, which appears to
have no such power. But this is illusory. The approval of AVB is, in
effect, the promulgation of general rules governing contract contents.
Thus in fact, if not in theory, the German department exercises more
rule-making or "legislative" power than American departments, for in
fact, if not in theory, the department promulgates standard policies in
most fields after negotiation with the insurers and consultation with
experts.
One reason the German method is more systematic than the Ameri-
can is that approval of AVB is only one illustration of a general technique
used widely for various contracts of adhesion in Germany. By contrast,
there is great variation in the United States even in insurance, with each
line subjected to a different kind and intensity of control. There may
be statutory standard policies in one field, standard provisions in an-
other, standard provisions accompanied by administrative control in a
third, and administrative control based on general standards or no stand-
ards in a fourth. Though uniformity of procedure and rule is not always
a virtue, there is reason to think that it is in this case. While it could be
argued that the American techniques are better adapted to the special
problems of particular lines of insurance, on the whole it is our feeling
that the American diversity reflects mainly historical accident and lack of
system in the development of insurance law.
Despite the relative constancy and system in German form approval,
there are numerous variations among the different lines of insurance.
The organization of the department is an important causal factor, as are
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the differences in the problems of the various branches of the industry.
In Germany the real work of policy form control is done by the staff
members of particular sections, who deal as specialists with individual
lines of insurance. Differences develop that reflect differences of per-
sonality more than any real difference between lines of insurance. In
the United States, policy approval is decentralized only occasionally;
ordinarily one policy approval section handles the entire matter. Dif-
ferences result from various causes: divergent statutes, economic dif-
ferences between fields, and historical accident.
3. Rigidity in the Insurance Market. In scope of control there is
considerable difference among the systems. The German distinction be-
tween general policy conditions which must be approved and special policy
conditions which need not be is not always found in the United States;
in some states all policies must be approved before being used. In prac-
tice, however, there is often dispensation from the general requirements
and there are a number of statutes that authorize it. The power to dis-
pense is important for flexibility in the insurance market.
The possibility for experimentation and variation that seems to exist
in Germany is qualified by prohibition of discriminatory contracts; in fact
the special policies for individual cases seem not to be extensively offered.
There is probably more flexibility in the United States, if one focuses on
a single state. Apart from interstate operations, the American system is
less cumbersome than the German, especially because the deemer clause
puts pressure on insurance departments to deal expeditiously with policy
approval problems. The German system does not have this compulsive
device.
Insurance companies do not seem to regard the German regulation
as excessively burdensome in this field, but some brokers do. We are in-
clined to agree with the brokers. Though the system has many virtues, it
is a burden that the German insurance business should not have to carry
unmodified in the coming decades; without change the process may prove
to be a handicap to German companies seeking to compete in more flexible
markets as international business increases.
If an insurance company needs to receive approval from most Amer-
ican insurance departments before it can make a policy available to an
insured with wide ranging commercial operations, there may be long de-
lay. Some departments may even hold out adamantly and never give per-
mission. Thus, apparently Michigan was once a lone hold out on an ex-
clusion of intentional injury in disability policies or double indemnity
clauses in life insurance; the fact of its loneliness did not seem to persuade
the department. If approval is possible at all, however, it is not likely to
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take so long as the decade it may take to get approval Of new AVB in
Germany. Still it is long enough to discourage many policyholders and
send them abroad to Lloyd's or to other "surplus lines" insurers.
When larger public problems are in issue, the time may be shortened.
When Mutual of Omaha introduced a Senior Security Policy in 1959 the
importance of the outcome in helping to solve a major social problem led
insurance departments to cut red tape to a minimum. Forty days after
the results of experiments in a few states proved the feasibility of the
plan, the new policy was on the market in all states."'8 Such expeditious
approval can be expected only rarely, however. Normally, the approval
process is so time-consuming that many insurance men regard it as one
of the major problems of the insurance business.
C. Summary
The techniques of control in the European and American systems
are quite divergent, even when their goals are equally comprehensive.
The German and American systems, for example, seek and achieve much
the same objectives. The divergences seem at first to be very great, but
the main differences are in technique and not in either goal or achieve-
ment. The differences appear greater if one looks only at legislative or
administrative control than when one contemplates the whole. The bu-
reaucratic machinery of the German administrative agency is systematic
though unduly cumbersome and has resulted in a highly institutionalized
procedure for the close control of general policy terms. The very cum-
bersomeness of the procedure has necessitated use of the techniques in
such a way as to make it unnecessary that they be used frequently. Thus
actual approval of AVB has come to be routine, the department concern-
ing itself with the development of standard AVB. Though the German
department has, in theory, no power to make general rules, that is what
the department does in fact. In the United States, the main focus of con-
trol is also upon the development of rules, with the approval process itself
tending to become routine. However, in the United States the rules are
developed in a multiplicity of ways not paralleled in Germany. Standard
policies and standard provisions specified by the legislature, standards
created by the legislature but not formulated in precise terms, standards
created by the insurance department under rule-maldng authorization,
and standards applied by the department though never formulated all
contribute to the development of a body of rules that is unsystematically
stated and not always easy to find but that does determine what will and
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will not be approved. Only if the insurance company desires to go be-
yond the established patterns and create something new do problems arise.
Then there must be negotiations with the insurance department similar
to though less formal and systematic than those engaged in by a German
insurer that wishes to depart from the standard AVB.
The obvious weakness of the German system is its cumbersomeness,
which results in an undesirable rigidity. This weakness is, in effect, an
exaggeration of the system's greatest virtue, its insistence upon trans-
parency of the market, which follows upon exemplary insistence on clarity
of expression and a substantial measure of uniformity. Hopefully, these
virtues need not be discarded; a better balance should be sought and
should be attainable. It is easy to overestimate the cumbersomeness of
the German system, however. There are techniques, such as geschifts-
planmdssige Erklirungen, for acting quickly when that seems necessary.
IMforeover, the price of cumbersomeness is not necessarily paid by the
policyholder, who can solve his problems by buying in a freer foreign
market, while domestic companies lose a part of their business. In a sense,
the value of protecting the "interest of the policyholder" is in competi-
tion with the value of a thriving domestic insurance market. Forming
judgments here is difficult and the authors are not entirely agreed on the
extent to which the cumbersomeness of the German procedure is the basis
for criticism of the German system.
Lack of system is probably the greatest weakness of American con-
trol. Rigidity is far less apparent than in Germany on an individual state
level, though multiplication of jurisdictions gives the entire system a de-
gree of rigidity that is undesirable for interstate risks. Efforts to reform
and improve the American system of policy control should probably be
directed toward the adoption of the more desirable aspects of the German
technique, the great emphasis upon clarity of expression and enough uni-
formity to provide a "transparent" market, and the more systematic and
formal method that better informs people who must deal with the depart-
ment. The deliberateness of the process should be avoided, however.
Industry organizations might be used more systematically, as they are
in Germany.
From these suggestions follow our notions of the direction in which
movement is necessary to create a system better than either the American
or the German. It would be a system in which the care and thoroughness
in the development of standard AVB that are central to the German sys-
tem were used to develop individual clauses to go into a storehouse from
which they might be drawn, as needed, to build up a policy. If (1) the
German focus were shifted from whole policies to individual clauses, and
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(2) the system permitted more alternatives, much of the objection to it
would disappear. Not all clauses should be treated alike. Uniformity
of technical terms like notice clauses is highly desirable; competition is
better directed to other questions like scope of coverage and price. With
respect to the latter matters freedom to compete is important; on other
clauses control does no harm. All clauses should be drafted with the
utmost care to say exactly what is intended; once the drafting has proved
satisfactory it should not be changed until it no longer serves the purpose.
But there should be alternative permissible formulations so the company
is not strait-jacketed. The objective of clarity should not be used as an
excuse for stifling competition, as it tends to be in both systems (but
especially in the German). Competition is a better regulator, on the
whole, than insurance departments and it should be used to the maximum
extent possible.
At the conclusion of the earlier article, we observed that despite the
technical divergence among the systems, "when viewed in their totality
they seem to accomplish much the same purpose." We think that this
conclusion emerges more clearly from an examination of both legislative
and administrative control than from either alone. For example, the
American statutory control of insurance policy terms is all or nearly all
is cogens, while the German is mostly ius dispositivum. But when ad-
ministrative control is included as a part of the picture, there is more
balance, for in America there is less compulsion at the administrative
level than in Germany.
An even better illustration of the point comes from a comparison of
the German and the French systems. The existence of a going and ef-
fective system of administrative control when the German Insurance Con-
tracts Act was under consideration removed the pressure to enact a sub-
stantial number of compulsory provisions. In France, on the other hand,
there was no effective insurance department in operation, and the In-
surance Contracts Act is full of ius cogens.
In making the above point, we do not wish to be understood as say-
ing that all systems will produce the same result in a given fact situation.
This is demonstrably not the case. There are important differences from
one system to another. What we do say is that the systems are respond-
ing to similar pressures and that when the whole picture is seen, there is
far less divergence in result than when only part of it is seen. German
and American statutes look quite unlike. The unsystematic character and
bad drafting of American state legislation are proverbial. Ad hoc solu-
tions lead to a virtual chaos of confused and conflicting provisions. On
the other hand, European statutes tend to be systematic and purposeful.
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Moreover, administrative control is unlike in the United States and Ger-
many. But in both countries there is, in the end, substantial public control
over the terms of insurance contracts, and the control points in the same
direction and largely achieves the same objectives. In many instances,
the details of the results are the same. In both places, there is as much con-
trol as seems to be needed; in the opinion of many people there is far
too much.
The matter is extremely complicated and facile answers are not satis-
factory answers. On the whole, however, we do think that any change
should be in the direction of more freedom, not more control. This is
not because more control could not theoretically achieve sound goals. It
is because, relative to the means available for its performance, the task is
too complex. Engulfed in a tidal wave of forms, the American approval
process tends to become mechanical and superficial; overwhelmed by the
goal of perfection of complex documents, the German process permits-
no, encourages-the development of an inflexible market. One goal (per-
haps it is only a necessity) of insurance law is economy of means. It is
unsound and in the end destructive to impose tasks on regulatory agencies
that they cannot handle. This danger has too often been courted in in-
surance regulation-and notably in the approval of policy forms. But
there is now some awareness of the problem and a greater tendency than
ever before to try to accommodate the regulatory tasks selected for per-
formance to available resources.
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